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Introduction 
Report on DIMACS Working Group Meeting: 
Mathematical Sciences Methods for the Study of Deliberate 
Releases of Biological Agents_ and their Consequences 
Preface 
Authors: 
Carlos Castillo-Chavez, Cornell University 
Fred S. Roberts, DIMACS, Rutgers University 
On March 22-23 at Rutgers University in Piscataway, NJ, a selected group of computer 
scientists, mathematicians, statisticians, biologists, epidemiologists, NSF and NIH program 
directors, yovemment health officials and scientific leaders involved in homeland security met at 
DIMACS. The meeting, which was supported by the National Science Foundation, had as one 
of its main objectives to explore the potential use of mathematical sciences methods and 
approaches to the study of the deliberate release ofbiological agents and their consequences. An 
additional goal was to catalyze the establishment of working groups with the expertise to 
investigate the potential uses methods of the mathematical sciences (mathematics, computer 
science, statistics and operations research) to defend against bioterrorism. This meeting also 
provided a forum for the identification of additional issues associated with homeland security in 
which mathematics could play a useful role. 
The meeting focused on the identification of the challenges posed by bioterrorism and the 
potential uses of mathematical methods and approaches to meet them. Twenty short talks laid out 
some of these challenges.2 Participants split up into self-selected discussion groups. The results 
of these discussions were documented through white papers co-authored by the group 
participants. 3 The potential uses of these documents are multiple: they may lead to follow-on 
efforts in particular areas identified during this meeting as well as to the identification of areas 
where expertise is lacking. Furthermore, it is the hope of participants and organizers that the 
series of white papers included in this document will also help members of the scientific 
enterprise, funding agencies, health officials as well as those in charge of homeland security 
establish productive partnerships in the fight against bioterrorism. 
1 DIMACS, the Center for Discrete Mathematics and Theoretical Computer Science, is a consortium of Rutgers and 
Princeton Universities, AT&T Labs, Bell Labs, NEC Research Institute, and Telcordia Technologies, and is 
headquartered at Rutgers. 
2 A program is included in an appendix. 
3 The list of all participants is provided in an appendix. 
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CDC4 in the early 1950's established and developed intelligence epidemiological services. This 
decision, driven in part by national concerns about the potential use of biological agents as a 
source of terror, was one of the first systematic responses to bioterrorism. The horror of 
September II and the events that followed have shown that the delivery of biological agents can 
be carried out by the systematic use of humans or by nontraditionai means (maii). 
Recent acts ofbioterrorism using anthrax have highlighted the use ofbiological agents as 
weapons of mass destruction as well as psychological agents ofterror. Speculative discussions 
on the possible impact of the deliberate release of viruses such as smallpox into unsuspecting 
human populations have taken place from time to time over the years. The possible genetic 
manipulation of highly variable viruses such as influenza, for which there is not an effective 
vaccine in storage, and their deliberate release are a source of great concern. 
The current national emergency has forced us to consider alternative preventative national and 
global measures such as vaccination, vaccine dilution, and antibiotic and vaccine stockpiling. 
Responsive strategies such as the systematic isolation (quarantine) ofindividuals, buildings, 
populations and regions, the rapid control of mass transportation systems and the systematic 
surveillance of food and water supply remain present issues for which mathematical modeling is 
extremely relevant. Integrated bioterrorist management techniques must be tested and developed 
with the aid of the most recent computational and statistical methods and tools. 
Surveillance approaches have typically been based on the assumption that the problem begins 
with a single outbreak, a single source, a concentrated focus or a well identified region of 
infection. There were further advances, for example, when Rvachev and collaborators in the 70's 
and 80's looked at the role of transportation systems on the geographic spread of the flu and 
pondered the potential use of transportation systems as a mechanism for the deliberate release of 
biological agents. Today, the likelihood of multiple and simultaneous releases poses a challenge 
not only to those in charge of the surveillance and control of unexpected outbreaks but to our 
national security. 
The impact of deliberate releases of biological agents (Foot and Mouth, Mediterranean Fruit 
Flies, Citrus rust, etc.) on agricultural systems and/or our food supply needs to be addressed and 
evaluated. For example, Foot and Mouth disease was most likely accidentally introduced in 
Britain nearly simultaneously at multiple sites via the cattle food supply and agricultural 
personnel movement. Hence, it was difficult to contain this outbreak despite Britain's effective 
post-detection response (stamping-out). The costs associated with its containment have been 
estimated to be over $15 billion. 
The use of agents like anthrax highlights the need to look at existing models for the dispersion of 
pathogens in buildings (models of air-flow in buildings) and in water systems (e.g. dispersion 
while flowing through pipes). However, new paradigms are needed for the study of releases of 
these agents in rather unconventional ways. The potential use of communication systems (e.g., 
4 Centers for Disease Control 
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mail) for the deliberate spread oflethal pathogens poses formidable practical and theoretical 
challenges. Hence, the need to model detectors and to develop innovative methods of detection is 
important. The possible deliberate contamination of water systems raises disturbing scenarios 
and, consequently, formidable challenges since detection, evaluation and response must be 
effective and immediate. 
Current advances in genomics provide useful tools that could be used to defend against and 
prevent bioterrorism. DNA sequencing is now routinely used to characterize pathogens' strain 
phylogenies, a critical step in the identification of potential sources of supply of an agent and, 
consequently, in the possible identification of networks of terror. In fact, the use of genomics 
research may allow us to fingerprint and hence document the work carried out at national 
laboratories and other facilities where scientists work with potentially dangerous biological 
agents. This sort of research will be of great help not only in forensics, after an attack is over or 
well underway, but may allow for the development of increased national and international 
security measures for the handling of biological agents. 
Preventing terrorist attacks depends heavily on understanding the subtle and highly unstable 
social processes that provoke terrorism. Much research is needed in this area. The deliberate 
release of biological agents is likely to be carried out by sophisticated and highly indoctrinated 
groups of individuals. The dynamics of these groups (how they are formed and maintained) as 
well as those associated with the spread of fanatic ideologies (which can be modeled as a serious 
disease) need to be understood. The survival and reproduction of bioterrorist cells depends on the 
mechanisms behind these dynamics (for example, the impact of their activities in the local or 
regional modification of cultural norms). A serious effort to understand and model the dynamics 
of these groups, their impact on cultural norms and the identification of pressure points is 
therefore critically important. 
Role of the Mathematical Sciences 
The mutually beneficial relationship between mathematics and biology has a long tradition. Its 
impact in the fields of ecology, physiology, epidemiology, immunology, genetics, resource 
management, the health sciences, to name some key areas, has been well documented5• Further 
development of these methods is stymied by associated difficult computational and theoretical 
challenges. Progress will require the involvement of computer and computational scientists who 
have not previously worked in this field. Support and encouragement of computer, and 
computational scientists and mathematicians who are willing to work in close collaboration with 
teams of interdisciplinary scientists to address these challenges is of utmost national importance. 
The current explosions in computer technology and computational methods have resulted in the 
availability of new methods of potential importance for bioterrorism defense, for instance 
through an accelerated growth in the field known as computational biology. New types of 
mathematical methods, for instance those at the intersection of discrete mathematics and 
theoretical computer science, also hold promise . 
5 Mathematics and Biology, The lnteiface, Challenges and Opportunities, Simon Levin, ed., NSF PUB-701 
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An exciting and critical current scientific frontier lies in biology. The events of September II 
have shown that this new frontier must also include sociological and economical concerns in a 
rather fundamental way. Mathematical methods are the most effective way that we have to make 
precise some of the efforts being carried out at the intersection ofthe natural and social sciences 
that are critical to our national security. This use of mathematical methods should be a natural 
and fundamental component of the policy decision making process. 
The marriage between mathematics and some sub-areas of the social sciences is not as well 
established as that between mathematics and biology. Further interactions between sociologists 
and economists and mathematical and computer scientists need to be fostered if we are to 
increase our understanding of the structure and dynamics of social networks/social contacts, a 
critical piece of any bioterrorism attack response plans. Understanding and modeling the spread 
of and support for opinions or ideologies that underlie terrorism is a vital job that falls at this 
interface as well. 
The policy and economic issues associated with globalization have increased the impact that 
local and global perturbations may have on otherwise stable communities. Furthermore, the time 
scales at which their effect operates have dramatically accelerated. Influenza epidemics travel 
around the world at an increasing pace. The economic impact of the national economies of 
countries like Argentina, Brazil, Canada or Mexico may impact our own economy instantly. 
Globalization and the possibility of isolated or systematic bioterrorist acts have increased the 
demand for the development of theoretical and practical frameworks that anticipate, prevent and 
respond to acts of destabilization. Theoretical frameworks and the development of models that 
respond to specific focused questions are essential. These models will be useful in the 
identification of key pressure points in the system, to test for robust system features, and to look 
at the importance of system modularity and redundancy in addressing threats to various system 
components. The use of models is not limited to the biological sciences but in fact their use must 
be deeply connected to the social, behavioral and economical sciences. For example, the impact 
ofbioterrorist acts on national and cultural behavioral norms has to be of great concern to those 
in charge of our national and homeland security. The destabilization of national cultural norms 
could make unacceptable population and behavioral risks not only acceptable but also pervasive. 
The consequences of such instabilities are obvious from the wave of suicide/homicide bombers 
in the Middle East. 
Mathematical models have been widely used by government and industry; for the development 
of economic policy, transportation planning, logistics, scheduling, resource allocation, financial, 
health and military planning and forecasting. Mathematical models are at the heart of many of 
the decisions made in these and related areas by such federal agencies as Transportation, 
Commerce, Defense, Energy, Centers for Disease Control, to name a few, and in the private 
sector in industries such as airlines, oils, biotechnology, financial, etc. 
The efforts to guide the fight against bioterrorism that are based on the intuition of experts, while 
invaluable, may indeed be insufficient. The levels of complexity associated with the multiple 
facets involved in the fight and planning against bioterrorist threats are paralleled in current 
biological research. For example, components of host-pathogen systems are sufficiently 
numerous and their interactions sufficiently complex that intuition alone is insufficient to fully 
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understand the dynamics of such interactions. Experimentation or field trials are often 
prohibitively expensive, unethical or impossible. Furthermore, there are no real data to validate 
most hypotheses of interest. Thus, mathematical modeling has become an important 
experimental and analytical tool of the policy maker. Models, just as they have done in the 
biological and environmental sciences, will help our efforts to fight bioterrorism. They will 
sharpen our understanding of fundamental processes; allow us to compare alternative policies 
and interventions; help make decisions; provide a guide for training exercises and scenario 
development; guide risk assessment; aid forensic analysis; and help predict or forecast future 
trends. . . The use of mathematical models to help in the fight against bioterrorism is not only 
natural but so critically important that several groups have already began to apply them in urgent 
policy decisions (e.g., in the recent smallpox vaccine discussions). 
The use of mathematical models and methods to fight bioterrorism does not have to be 
developed from scratch. A wide variety of tools are available in the mathematical sciences as 
well as a wealth of modeling approaches that have been developed in the natural and social 
sciences. These methods and approaches provide a natural starting point for the use of 
quantitative methods for homeland security and defense. 6 The key is to make policy makers 
aware of the wide variety of mathematical sciences tools that are already available. Approaches 
that include mathematical components will be extremely useful as long as there is a national 
effort that promotes, supports and fosters partnerships between modelers and policy makers and 
between mathematical scientists and epidemiologists and public health professionals. This 
meeting was designed to play the role of catalyst in this direction. An important message coming 
out of our meeting is that the appropriate modification of existing methods as well as the 
blending of new approaches with old ones will go a long way in preparing for the fight against 
bioterrorism and its consequences. The researchers involved in this project endorse the view that 
it is essential to create and support the required mechanism that will make effective use of the 
talents of the mathematical sciences community in this critical area of homeland defense. 
White Papers 
In all, seven discussion groups met and prepared white papers 7, emphasizing challenges for the 
mathematical sciences in bioterrorism defense. 
The Biosurveillance8 Group focused on sources of data, data mining, and on the development of 
technology and methods that would facilitate the quick identification of threats or attacks. The 
~SIAM's 50'" anniversary meeting will feature three special sessions organized by Castillo-Chavez, on the usc of 
models in homeland defense. The DIMACS "Special Focus" on Computational and Mathematical Epidemiology 
will feature numerous workshops and working group meetings at which mathematical scientists will team with 
biological scientists, epidemiologists, and public health professionals in the use of quantitative methods in homeland 
security and defense. This workshop was the first event totally dedicated to homeland defense 
7 While minor editorial changes have been made or recommended, for the most part, we (CC and FR) left the 
content of these white papers to the entire discretion of the members of each group. When agreement was not total 
dissenting views were sometimes noted by the group itself in their white paper. 
" Facilitator, Marcello Pagano, Harvard University 
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group emphasized the importance of three steps: data collection, analysis, and reporting. The 
group emphasized the fundamental challenge of dealing with the twin goals of rapid detection 
and preservation of privacy. 
The Evolution Discussion Group9 stressed the fact that models of evolution can advance the analysis 
and understanding of transmission systems in several ways. In the context ofbioterrorist threats, 
they can heip identify the source of agents in bioterrorist events. The fitting of transmission models 
of common infectious agents was identified as an important step in the estimation of parameters. 
Knowledge of the ranges of such parameters may help differentiate natural versus man-driven 
events. 
The discussion group on Modeling Bioterror Response Logistic/0 focused on responses to a 
major bioterrorist attack. This group stressed the importance of logistic modeling in planning of 
two types: structural level (pre-attack) and operational level (during or after an attack), and noted 
the importance oflogistic models of distribution, inventory, scheduling and manpower. 
The group discussing The Design of Control Strategies 11 focused on the use of models as tools for 
public policy decision making. The context for such models included: agent release, spread, 
detection, analysis (modeling), advice, and action. It was noted that models may help prepare for 
possible terrorist attacks, as well as to aid in responding optimally in real-time. This group identified 
the nature of the threat and response as well as human behavior as critical components in the design, 
evaluation and implementation of any policies. 
The Computer Science12 Discussio~ Group ide~tified challenges for the computer sciences in six 
areas: simulation and virtual environments; database policies and information exchange; 
intelligence and detection; fault tolerance; consequence management; and computational 
molecular biology. 
The Agricultural Study Group, 13 whose work was driven by concerns about agriterrorism, 
focused on forestry and aquaculture as well as on food and the food industry. Economic, health 
and safety, social and vulnerability issues were addressed in a broad context. Mathematical 
challenges identified included ways to model multiple attacks across large geographic regions; 
the application of methods of risk analysis to calculate the degree to which various sectors ofthe 
food industry are vulnerable to agriterrorist attack; and the development of mathematical models 
to determine the cost effectiveness of deterrence strategies that depart from current agricultural 
practice. 
The Agent-based and Differential Equation Model~'for Transition Dynamics 14 Discussion Group 
identified key simulation scenarios for which agent-based and differential equation models can 
9 Facilitator, James Koopman, University of Michigan 
111 Facilitator, Ed Kaplan, Yale University 
11 Facilitators John Glasser (CDC) and Ellis McKenzie (NIH) 
12 Facilitator, Fred Roberts, Rutgers University 
1 ~ Facilitator, Simon Levin, Princeton University 
14 Facilitator, Mac Hyman, Los Alamos National Laboratory 
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be combined to address critical strategic policy and planning issues. Associated with the threat of 
bioterrorism, this group focused on highlighting the importance of model robustness, complexity, 
sensitivity and modularity in model building. 
Concluding Remarks 
One of the highlights ofthe meeting was the remarkable interest in and wiiiingness to 
communicate among the participants from many different disciplines. Participants in this 
meeting stressed the importance of absorbing the fact that we are facing a truly new paradigm. 
Effective approaches to dealing with the new reality will require truly interdisciplinary efforts 
and bold new initiatives. 
The fact that perpetrators ofbioterrorism on the one hand and politicians, scientists, health and 
government officials on the other have a different set of cultural norms was highlighted as a 
major barrier to our mode of thinking, operating and reacting. The ability to plan under shifting 
bioterrorist cultural norms was highlighted by all participants. 
The theory developed by those working in mathematical epidemiology, while effective, has been 
carried out in a setting that does not allow for experimental verification and validation in typical 
scientific fashion. Furthermore, epidemics have been studied under the assumption that they are 
natural phenomena. The same ethical considerations that apply to epidemiological research also 
apply to research associated with bioterrorist threats. We are left with no recourse other than the 
use of mathematical models in strategic ways. 
Furthermore, it was clear that current mathematical paradigms have to be modified to include the 
potential deliberate release of pathogens under conditions (critical pressure points) that are likely 
to cause the most damage and destruction to human populations. This is a different way of 
thinking and, consequently, it is not part of traditional mathematical epidemiology. 
In general models should be initially used to identify worst case scenarios, to identify critical 
pressure points in systems and to provide scenarios that are likely to increase our understanding 
of the possibilities and dangers. Mathematical models or approaches must nevertheless be 
evaluated by a community of experts and by the wealth of methods that have been available in 
fields like epidemiology, ecology, transportation science, and military logistics. Sensitivity 
analysis to model assumptions and model robustness should be applied whenever feasible and a 
variety of group efforts and alternative approaches should be encouraged. Models should be used 
as an aid in the development of policies, approaches and defense systems that help anticipate 
terrorist attacks. Therefore, the issues associated with modeland system redundancy and the 
importance of system modularity need to be systematically addressed. 
There was considerable discussion of the game-theoretic aspects and deterrence effects of 
revealing response strategies in bioterrorist defense. It was in this context that the need for new 
mathematics, new computational approaches, new models, and new paradigms was discussed . 
It was clear to participants that current models and efforts did not systematically consider the 
impact of deliberate biological releases by humans who have access to some of the same 
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information that we have. Moreover, making information available to potential adversaries was a 
source of concern to the participants in the meeting. 
Issues of homeland security and defense have brought into sharp focus the importance of 
interdisciplinary research and the critical responsibility that we have to foster joint research 
efforts in fields that have previously communicated in a peripheral manner. Mathematical 
sciences provide the language needed to open, enhance and support the channels of 
communication required for this effort. 
The working group coorganizers were delighted with the response of the participants and 
appreciated the hard work of all involved. We hope that the white papers included in this report 
will help stimulate further discussion, expansion and clarification of the issues raised by a 
distinguished group of members of the scientific community. We also hope that the content and 
questions raised by these white papers will lead to expanding partnerships among the participants 
and their colleagues both through continued activities of this working group and in the broader 
community. 
Finally, it must be noted that by its own nature, this effort was the result of the participation of a 
selected group of distinguished scientists. Many who were invited could not join us. 
Furthermore, our own limited knowledge of the issues associated with bioterrorism limited our 
choice of invitees. We apologize for the obvious and not so obvious omissions . 
1 ~ Institute for Mathematics and its Applications, University of Minnesota 
16 Mathematical Sciences Research Institute, UC Berkeley 
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Report of the DIMACS Discussion Group on Biosurveillance 
Group Members 
Marcello Pagano, Harvard University (facilitator) 
Sankar Basu, IBM 
Marco Bonetti, Harvard University 
Drew Harris, University of Medicine and Dentistry ofNew Jersey 
Richard Heffernan, NYC Department of Health 
David Madigan, Rutgers University 
David Ozonoff, Boston University (writer) 
Henry Rolka, CDC 
David Rosenbluth, Telcordia Technologies 
Daniel Wartenberg, University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey 
Introduction 
Surveillance is a core function of the public health infrastructure, used for policy, planning, 
evaluation and timely response to evolving health problems in the community. Surveillance is an 
ongoing activity that relies upon indirect and coarse-grained data, less for specific research 
purposes, than for the direction of administrative objectives. Surveillance data plays an 
important role both in the guidance of public health policies, planning, and evaluation, and in the 
detection and recognition of important public health events and trends. The value of monitoring 
the health of the populace and of establishing norms arises from the use of these activities in 
detecting and recognizing deviations from these norms. Moreover, once an epidemic has been 
recognized, data gathered from a surveillance system enables the characterization of the 
epidemic and the formulation of a response. The value of surveillance systems is highlighted by 
examining the consequences of lack of monitoring in those places around the world where 
surveillance is poor. Despite their basic importance to public health, surveillance activities and 
research are chronically underfJnded and consequently attract little academic interest. 
Concern about naturally emerging or criminally instigated infectious disease outbreaks have 
renewed interest in surveillance as one of the first lines of defense in protecting the community. 
Both in the efficacy of treatment and, more importantly, in preventing spread of an infectious 
disease or further exposure to a chemical agent, time is the enemy. Days or hours are the time 
scale that matters here, not weeks, months or years, the scale ofusual surveillance activities. 
Given the limitations of current surveillance systems and the need for response on such a short 
time scale, two important questions were asked with respect to applications of mathematics to 
surveillance: Could new mathematical techniques be used to enhance the utility of existing 
systems? and Could new mathematical techniques be used to design or devise new surveillance 
systems useful for detecting emerging infections or bioterrorist events? 
The group considered the low signal-to-noise problem in the detection of a disease outbreak (for 
example in the case of anthrax or smallpox) and the .role of the astute clinician in the 
conventional medical care system in detecting such. weak signals. Detection of rare events by a 
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clinician requires that diagnostic evidence raise the probability of the existence of the rarity 
above threshold in the mind of the clinician. Several factors work against this probability being 
raised above threshold. Many diseases have non-specific symptoms or share symptoms with 
common illnesses (for example anthrax shares many symptoms with the flu). Another factor is 
the rarity of bio-terrorist events. Any surveillance system with any appreciable transaction cost 
connected solely with such occurrences would soon wither from lack of financial support and 
fading interest from those who collect the data. 
The fact that the only two documented bioterrorist events in this country prior to the recent 
anthrax attacks both involved more common infectious agents, Salmonella and Shigella (each 
important in their own right as food.:. and water-borne pathogens of public health importance), 
coupled with the non-specific symptomology of many of the rarer bio-terrorist threats, implies 
that routine surveillance systems may need to raise initial alarms to ambiguous signals (such as 
an increase in flu-like symptoms) that would then require further investigation. It thus seemed 
to the group that the most reasonable application for mathematical applications would focus on 
timely and more accurate detection of common infectious, acute and chronic outcomes already 
the focus of existing or envisioned surveillance systems rather than new systems specifically 
designed to handle rare bio-warfare agents like anthrax, Q fever or tularemia17• This conclusion 
is based both on the likelihood of being able to design a feasible routine system that provides the 
kind of needed response and the principle that a dual use system one that is useful in normal 
times as well as times of crisis is the most practical strategy . 
The group abstracted the activities of a surveillance system into three components: collection, 
analysis, reporting. 
Data Collection and Reporting 
In a true surveillance system (as opposed to a special purpose or research data collection system) 
data collection is continuous, routine and stretches into the indefinite future. The occurrences 
that are registered and transmitted to the system happen in time and space so the different 
patterns and scales of those events and their transmission to and through the system might be 
amenable to analysis using a variety of mathematical techniques already available in other fields. 
For example, keeping track of sales and inventories is a common problem that has been handled 
with techniques from operations research and computer science, as is the problem of fault 
detection in computer networks and fraud detection in the use of credit cards. Having a real 
time picture of the state of the system would be an important objective for many uses of a 
surveillance system and increase its utility across the board. This could also encourage an 
existing goal of many public health systems today, the use of real time reporting for things like 
emergency department volume, HMO visits or fulfillment of certain kinds of indicator 
prescriptions or sales of over-the-counter drugs. 
The group spent considerable time brainstorming various usual and unusual sources of data that 
might be employed in a surveillance system, including data designed originally for billing 
17 Of course, surveillance at military installations or during military campaigns will not fit this general scheme. 
Biosurveillance in the military is critical and its planning requires reliable intelligence reports. 
May 17,2002 12 
• 
• 
• 
purposes, pharmacy data, 911 rolls, emergency departments, grocery, quantity of calls to MD 
offices, cancelled dentist appointments, nurses hotlines, poison control centers, school absences 
and similar sources. More unconventional sources might be records of hits to certain web sites 
relevant to the symptoms of interest. More important than the specific sources, however, was the 
possibility that certain kinds of mathematical techniques might suggest new kinds of data that 
could be exploited for surveillance purposes, for example, by showing how many different kinds 
of data could be combined in real time to yield information not obtainable by any one separately. 
This might be done by conventional multivariate methods of statistics or through pattern 
recognition algorithms generated in computer science and discrete mathematics. Use of cluster 
analysis or mathematical taxonomy techniques might allow definition and detection of 
syndromes that would signal an emerging epidemic or unusual cluster associated with a 
biowarfare agent. Moreover, combining outcome data with networks of environmental monitors 
or sensors might be a particularly useful way of early warning that could rescue some warfare 
agent specificity with the requirement for routine and dual use of the outcome data. Thus in a 
Bayesian system routine and noisy outcomes in the context of environmental data might allow a 
much earlier warning than outcome data alone by changing the prior probability of an event. It is 
not always clear, however, that adding additional data is a benefit if the extra data does not carry 
pertinent information. In that case it only adds to the noise, not the signal. Selecting useful 
ancillary data to combine with health outcome data will require close collaboration among 
biostatisticians, mathematicians and experts in biology, environmental science and 
epidemiology. Each data source captures specific populations or at least has its biases. New 
research is needed to eliminate such biases. 
Discussing wearable devices to track health status of a selection of sentinel individuals, or 
sensors (e.g. microphones) or biosensors in public spaces to detect unusual coughing or sneezing, 
for example, inevitably brings up issues of informed consent. Indeed, data which might be 
extremely useful for surveillance purposes is often not available because of privacy concerns. 
The group felt that it was worth exploring the extent to which mathematical approaches might be 
used to mask identities and thus possibly make more data sets available. Economic incentives 
might also be explored to encourage the flow of information. Overall strategic issues need to be 
studied, perhaps using game theory. 
The question of what kinds of information, its cost and its uncertainty or accuracy, are matters 
that are amenable to modeling. In some cases information models are available that would enable 
estimating the value of earlier detection, as in the recent case of post-exposure prophylaxis for 
anthrax exposure. In other cases, models might show what kinds of information yet need to be 
developed to allow such determinations and thus enable better decisions for future surveillance 
systems. Modeling could also be of value for designing a fault tolerant system that provides 
needed information for command and control (for example, who is affected, who are their 
contacts, what is the likely pattern of spread, where are they located, when were they affected, 
etc.). 
The group noted the value of multi-purpose systems. (For example, surveillance of asthma, 
injury, violence, etc. have a synergetic relationship, thus adding value.) Multiple data sources are 
also useful, but they may complicate the system to such an extent that they depreciate its value. 
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A two-stage approach could be useful: If a signal is picked up in an unlinked dataset, then one 
could go to other datasets or activate a full-scale, multiple source surveillance system. 
Analysis of Collected Data 
The group suggests that a data warehouse that provides a single portal for a variety of relevant 
information for surveillance and interpretation of surveillance data would be usefuL This would 
be a dataset of datasets that could combine real time environmental data, surveillance data of 
various kinds, administrative data (such as census information and health service resources) and 
other datasets of interest to those who must interpret and act upon surveillance data. Use of 
relational database technology or distributed database techniques could be helpful. The group 
believes any such Information System should adhere to an Open Source philosophy so workers 
could understand and improve the kinds of information provided. 
Use of multivariate and pattern recognition techniques noted in the section on what data to 
collect are clearly relevant for analysis and the remarks in that section are pertinent here as well. 
The simultaneous analysis of multiple data sources is a multivariate stochastic model problem 
about which there is relevant biostatistics research. Questions of how to combine information 
from many sources might also be looked at from the computer science perspective where the 
same problem is faced in many different disciplines . 
Finally, the group believes that providing typical and publicly available real dataset or datasets 
to the research community would be an important step in allowing researchers to develop and 
test new methods of analysis and interpretation18• The use of current data, such as the NYC ED 
data, and historical data are worth considering in this regard. 
Reporting and Using the Surveillance Results 
A surveillance system is embedded in a larger command and control system. No surveillance 
system is useful if the results aren t or can t be used. Mathematics can have a role in considering 
various architectures for command and control, explicitly considering the surveillance system as 
a component part. The vulnerabilities of the system and the role surveillance plays in those 
vulnerabilities is an important question. It could be helpful in deciding what kinds of information 
get reported and to whom. 
The problem of false positives and false negatives and their costs is also important and will 
depend on how the information is used and where it fits into the sequence of actions. High false 
alarm rates are not only costly but can easily lead to the abandonment of the system or disregard 
of accurate information. Use of ROC curves might be helpful in analyzing this problem and for 
the question of where to set thresholds for optimal effect. 
Modes of presentation of the data for line personnel, policy makers and support staff is also a 
problem which needs attention. Among the ways the group discussed were maps, color-coded 
alerts, and other visualization tools, some fairly sophisticated, from the theoretical computer 
18 Giving access to data to researchers has proved useful in genomics research. 
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science literature. Reducing complex quantitative information to easily assimilable form is an 
urgent task. Such techniques must reveal pertinent information while not misleading. Research 
needs to be performed to make this transmission of information as powerful, understandable and 
accurateg as possible. 
Summary 
The group considers that even in a cursory consideration of the surveillance problem there are 
many places where mathematical techniques, both conventional and those under development in 
other areas, might be helpful. In particular, it suggests that it might be useful to survey 
applications of discrete mathematics, computer science and operations research as they are now 
researched and used in other areas such as inventory control, bad credit or fraud detection or 
weather forecasting, to find new techniques for use in surveillance . 
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Report of DIMACS Evolution Discussion Group 
Group Members: 
James Koopman, University of Michigan (Facilitator) 
Donald Burke, The Johns Hopkins University 
Peter Merkle, Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
Mel Janowitz., Rutgers University 
Irene Eckstrand, NIGMS- NIH (Rapporteur) 
Evolution is an aspect of infection transmission systems. Agents and hosts evolve as a result of 
their interactions in the system. An important view of such evolution, however, is a view of the 
evolution of the transmission system and not just the agent or the host. Many models of 
transmission systems achieve their objectives while ignoring such evolution. But models that 
look at evolutionary process at the level of the system can advance the analysis of transmission 
systems in several ways. Relevant to bioterrorist threats, they can 
1. Help identify the source of agents in bioterrorist events. 
2. Help fit transmission models of common infectious agents so as to 
a. Better differentiate a bioterrorist dissemination of agents from a natural 
dissemination of agents 
b. Better prepare public health services to diminish circulation of either naturally 
disseminated or bioterrorist disseminated infectious agents 
3. Help predict the evolution ofbioterrorist infectious agents with regard to transmissibility, 
pathogenicity, immunogenicity, and antimicrobial sensitivity. 
Source Identification 
With regard to the first area of identifying the source of agents in bioterrorist events, 
phylogenetic models play a key role by indicating past history of the infectious agent spread 
through bioterrorism in relation to its evolution from known strains. The determination of the 
source of the anthrax in the recent bioterrorism incident is a case in point. Phylogenetic models 
first help to identify the subtype of the organism and thus narrow the search. Since the organism 
encountered has been cultured between the times it was passed from lab to lab, phylogenetic 
analysis also has the potential to indicate which lab the organism is coming from. Admittedly 
that requires extensive sequencing to find SNPs occurring at the rate of 1 o-8 per replication. But 
in this case, that is very much worth the effort. 
Particular needs in improving phylogenetic analysis models include models capable of including 
more causal model structure while examining high numbers of specimens. Also needed are 
better models of crossover and models that can be used for crossover detection. Also, models 
that can better estimate phylogenetic distances in the presence of crossover are needed. Once 
secondary transmission from multiple foci of a bioterrorist spread agent has occurred, good 
phylogenetic models should help to better pin down the times and numbers of cases directly 
caused by bioterrorist dissemination rather than by secondary transmission. 
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Transmission Model Fitting 
With regard to the second area of fitting transmission system models to data, the role of 
phylogenetic models can help specify transmission dynamic history because the fixation of 
evolved population variation results from the bottleneck events of transmission. Within any 
host, infectious agent evolution leads to variation around consensus nucleotide patterns related to 
the agent that started the infection. Transmitted agents come from a part of that variation that 
most usually establishes a new but related consensus pattern in the new host. The pattern of 
consensus sequences or the distribution of sequences in different hosts allow for inferences with 
regard to transmission distance between agents isolated from different hosts. 
Thus phylogenetic (or in this case of within species analysis more appropriately genealogic ) 
distance to the most recent common ancestor parallels transmission distance to the most recent 
common ancestor. Each infection transmission system model implies different patterns of 
transmission distances between the infectious agents isolated from infected individuals at 
different times. Thus competing models of a transmission system can be compared to actual data 
on genealogic distances to see which better fits observations. Also, when one model form is 
selected, the pattern of observed genealogic distances can be compared to the pattern of model 
predicted transmission distances for the purpose of estimating model parameters. 
A particular area of mathematical investigation needed here is the elaboration of how virus 
dynamics within the host and the number of agents involved in transmission events affect the 
relationship between genealogic distance and transmission distance to the most recent common 
ancestor. The classic model of Rogers and Harpending is a bare beginning for what needs to be 
done. 
Patterns of transmission distances will be particularly valuable in distinguishing models of 
bioterrorist dissemination from models of natural dissemination. This distinction should be an 
immediate task when a new infectious agent emerges and one cannot be sure if the enhanced 
virulence ofthat agent arose naturally or artificially. 
The use of genealogic distances to model the logistics of response to a bioterrorist event depends 
absolutely on studies of natural transmission. After a bioterrorist event has occurred, it is too late 
to undertake such studies. It is before the bioterrorist event that such studies need to be 
employed on natural transmission events. Genealogic distances should be used to fit 
transmission system models for airborne and enteric infections at local, regional, and national 
levels. Particularly useful agents to study in this regard are influenza and caliciviruses. RSV and 
rotavirus studies may also be very valuable. The local, regional and national models of these 
agents should be adapted to natural history of infection and immunity parameters of the involved 
bioterrorist agent and to initial immunity and bioterrorist source conditions. 
Predicting Evolution of Bioterrorist Agents 
The pattern or network of contacts that can transmit infection are a key determinant of 
infectious agent evolution. Socio-economic change, population growth and population mobility 
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(travel) are changing contact patterns in ways that affect the evolution and the evolvability of 
infectious agents. For some kinds of contact, such as airborne transmission, contact patterns are 
becoming denser and more capable of sustaining altered infectious agents until they can adapt 
enough to better sustain their circulation with more usual levels of contact. In these cases there 
can be a compression of genome space in the sense that increased opportunities for genetic 
exchange accelerate the exploration of genome space. For some kinds of contact, such as fecal 
oral, hygienic improvements are diminishing the network connections that sustain transmission 
and permit evolutionary adaptation. Obviously, characterization of the social landscapes and 
social landscape dynamics and their role in disease evolution are central. 
The impact of contact dynamic networks on disease evolution is quite relevant. The issue of the 
evolution of virulence in the case of enhanced bioterrorist organisms is critical. In most cases, 
virulence enhancement will decrease transmission fitness. Thus the chances of the virulence-
enhanced agent becoming endemically established may be diminished. But high transmission 
environments will increase the opportunity for the bioterrorist organism to adapt and thus 
increase its transmission fitness. Priority should be given to bioterrorist agent control in these 
settings. A clear analysis of what these settings are should be pursued with studies on the 
detailed transmission dynamics of naturally circulating agents. It will be too late once a 
bioterrorist event has occurred to identify these settings. 
For this purpose, models of virulence and its effects on transmissibility are particularly 
important. Such models must link infection dynamics within the host to infection dynamics at 
the population or community level (higher level of organization may be required in a globally 
connected society). Such linkage can be sought using brute computational force or by 
identifying simple algorithms or mathematical principles that facilitate this linkage. The 
integration of game theory or other decision approaches and models into transmission system 
models and policy seems like a promising direction. 
Relevant to this area in general are the models being developed to assess the evolution of 
antimicrobial resistance. They are relevant not only to the issue of adaptation of virulence 
enhanced organisms but also to combating bioterrorist agents that have been engineered to be 
resistant to antimicrobials. 
A key area for all infectious agent evolution models is how to include a wide variety of cross-
reacting strains of infectious agents in a model. Evolution almost always takes place in such a 
context and to assess evolution, evolved strains must be modeled separately from source strains. 
In most transmission system models, the number of strains increases model complexity in a 
highly exponential fashion. Some efforts that involved the development of models that 
incorporate crossimmunity (influenza) or increase susceptibility have been carried out but 
additional theoretical and mathematical work is needed. 
Specific Mathematical and Computer Science ChalleD!::;es 
• The previous discussion has identified the following needs: 
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I. Better within host infection models that can provide a base for understanding any new 
agents that might appear as well as helping to better model infection transmission 
systems 
2. Models relating within host infectious agent dynamics to transmissibility 
3. Models relating transmission events to genealogic distances 
4. Better models for calculating genealogic distances, especially given crossover 
5. Transmission system modeis with muitipie cross-reacting strains 
6. Game theory based evolutionary models that can be integrated into infection transmission 
system models 
Other mathematical issues affecting evolution to be addressed include 
7. How network models relate to compartmental models 
8. How scalability issues of network structure affect transmission dynamics 
9. Optimization models for epidemiological study designs 
Concluding Comments 
Evolutionary models on networks can be very complex but can be computationally more 
efficient than complex compartmental models that assume mixing in broad contexts, especially 
when multiple strains are involved. It seems that finding ways to integrate network and 
compartmental modeling approaches will help all areas of infection transmission system 
modeling, including models of evolution. 
Recently there has been interest in human contact patterns that may be non-scalable and 
therefore have quite different properties than those predicted from compartmental or lattice type 
models. Internet connection models have especially kindled this interest. While we felt that on 
some dimension all infection transmission contact networks had to be scalable because they all 
have strong geographic and social space determinants, the issue of risks of very large epidemics 
should be addressed in terms of network scale. 
The final issue relates to the fact that ongoing surveillance systems that elucidate transmission 
dynamics are essential to bioterrorist control in general and to the risks of evolution in general. 
Surveillance systems should be established on the basis of continuous quality improvement from 
analysis of data using a transmission system model as the base. For this to be the case, models 
that can define the optimal sets of data to be collected either on a routine basis in the system or in 
special studies that will help solidify the surveillance system are needed. 
In conclusion, efforts to integrate research in immunology (within host infection models), recent 
advances in genomics and molecular biology in the context of social networks interactions, and 
the impact of social landscape structure (at various scales) and their dynamics are critical to 
disease evolution. The challenge, common to many mathematical efforts, lies not only in this 
direct question but also in the associated inverse problem, namely, how can we use system 
transmission information to characterize pathogens evolution in natural as well as in human-
induced (bioterrorism) epidemics. 
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Report of the DIMACS Discussion Group on Modeling Bioterror Response Logistics 
Group Members: 
Edward Kaplan, Yale University (Facilitator) 
Douglas Arnold, Institute for Mathematics and its Applications, University of Minnesota 
(Rapporteur) 
David Banks, FDA 
Joseph DiPisa, Rutgers University 
Richard Ebright, Rutgers University 
Teresa Hamby, NJ Department of Health and Human Services 
Jon Kettenring, Telcordia Technologies 
Moshe Kress, Ctr. for Military Analyses (CEMA), Israel (writer) 
Lone Simonsen, NIAID - NIH 
Motivating Philosophy 
The group felt that the following points were essential to remember: 
• Logistics planning and operations will be a major factor in the outcome of a terrorist attack. 
• Proper logistics modeling can have a major impact on logistics planning and operation, and 
thus on the outcome of an event. 
• Logistics is just as important as epidemiology ( what we do to smallpox versus what 
smallpox does to us ). 
• Logistics/operations modeling has been employed and deployed successfully in disaster 
planning, military, manufacturing/supply chains, many industries, urban services, etc. 
• Logistics modeling is intended to support decision making at two levels: 
(a). Structural (or policy) level decisions made in advance. 
(b). Operational (or real-time) decisions taken during an event. 
Modeling is a crucial component of logistics planning and operations. Models are 
mathematical/computer constructs to represent realistic scenarios. Such models guide thinking 
and provide insight; predict consequences of different decisions in different scenarios; identifY 
key operational variables, system bottlenecks (e.g., maximum vaccination rate, quarantine 
capacity), critical paths, and so forth. 
Models help frame decisions. They can be used to detem1ine a set of policy options. Models can 
be used to estimate the consequences of these options (e.g., in terms of cases of disease, deaths, 
economic loss, damage to infrastructure, etc.). 
The ultimate consumers of models are decision makers. Models must be good enough to 
distinguish between policy options or construct good alternatives. Descriptive/prescriptive 
accuracy per se is not the primary objective. Many other factors beyond the results of the models 
go into the decision making. Models don t make decisions, people do. But modeling can be 
valuable for training and educating decision makers in advance of attacks. 
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There are mathematical modeling methods that have been developed and applied successfully in 
many related areas. These could be, but largely are not, being applied in the planning for 
bioterrorist threats. Certainly there are ways in which the application of planning for and dealing 
with bioterrorist threats will bring in aspects which may not have received much attention in 
other applications. But identifying and focusing on these at this point may not be the most 
important thing to do. 
Modeling the Bioterrorism Situation 
A malevolent agent (the Attacker) engages a population (the Defender) with acts of terror by 
releasing contagious biological agents. The Attacker may be an individual, an organization or a 
state. The Defender is typically a state. The Defenders objectives are: 
• To minimize the number of casualties; 
• To minimize economic cost of the attack; 
• To capture the Attacker and eliminate his threat. 
The Defender attempts to respond to the attack by: 
• Taking preventive measures such as modularity19 oriented vaccination; 
• Detecting the attack and identifying the biological agent; 
• Providing medical help to infected; 
• Tracing contacts and vaccinating susceptibles; 
• Isolating and quarantining infected and suspected carriers of the virus; 
• Identifying the Attacker (individual, organization or state) and neutralizing him. 
The Attacker may try to disrupt the response attempts of the Defender. 
The Types of Problems 
There are two types of problems that the Defender has to deal with: 
• Structural (strategic) level decisions that need to be made in advance; 
• Operational (real-time) decisions that are taken during the attack. 
Structural Level Decisions 
Structural level decisions concern strategic issues that relate to the readiness of the Defender to 
counter bioterror attacks. These issues are: 
• Size and mix20 of inventories (e.g., vaccine and other perishable items) at the national level; 
• Policies for managing and controlling the inventories (e.g., concentrate the supplies or 
distribute); 
• Deployment of the counter-bioterror infrastructure (e.g., detection systems, inoculation 
facilities); 
111 See Simon Levin's talk at the working group meeting. 
20 There may be a need to produce and store different types of vaccines according to demographic classifications 
such as age, weight and health condition. 
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• Manpower requirements and personnel pre-assignments; 
• Intelligence capabilities for detecting, identifying and eliminating the threat. 
It should be pointed out again that structural level decisions are made before any occurrence of a 
bioterror event. 
Operational Level Decisions 
Operational level decisions apply to situations where a bioterror event has occurred (i.e. there is 
operational or clinical evidence) or is suspected to be in progress. The single most important 
input for the operational-level decision making process is the time-dependent spatial probability 
distribution of susceptibles, asymptomatic contacts, etc. This probability distribution, which 
affects many of the operational-level decisions, may take a special (multimodal) shape if 
multiple outbreaks occur. There are situations where some policies are dominant over others for 
any distribution of susceptibles, and so this distribution may not be so important all the time. 
The decisions that are made at this level concern: 
• Identifying the type of the bioterror event. 
• Contact-tracing process. This process is important for obtaining better estimates for the 
aforementioned spatial probability distribution. (This may or may not make sense depending 
upon circumstances and should be considered a proposed option to be evaluated.) 
• Prioritization with respect to monitoring, isolating, quarantining and vaccinating- based on 
the spatial probability distribution. 
• Coordinating the supply chain of vaccines and other supplies (allocation of supplies, 
transportation schedules, etc.). 
• Operations management of service (i.e., vaccination, quarantine) centers. In particular 
identifying bottlenecks and potential congestions, determining capacities and setting service 
rates. 
• Identifying the threat (the Attacker) and trying to eliminate it or at least to reduce its 
effectiveness. 
Modeling Challenges 
Models for bioterror emergency response logistics are not necessarily prescriptive. Their main 
purpose is to supply relevant input data and information to the decision making process and to 
provide insights about the situation to decision-makers. Consequently, descriptive or predictive 
accuracy per se, that is prevalent (and needed) in mathematical epidemiology models, is not a 
primary objective in this case. Modeling issues are: 
• Estimating the time-dependent spatial probability distribution of susceptibles. As 
indicated above, this is an important process in managing a response to a bioterror event. 
The distribution is updated as more information (e.g. new infection cases, tracing results) 
is obtained. This dynamic updating process lends itself to information-theoretic models 
such as entropic algorithms. Also other statistical methods such as Bayesian prediction 
models and maximum likelihood models may be useful for obtaining the desired 
distribution. 
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• Solving a two-stage problem. Structural and operational decisions take place in highly 
uncertain environments and therefore can be naturally represented by stochastic 
programming models. Structural decisions must be taken in advance while (at least some 
of) operational decisions may be postponed until a bioterror event actually occurs (and its 
characteristics unfold). Hence, a two-stage model with recourse or some variant of a 
chance-constrained programming model may be an appropriate way to approach this 
complex problem. Dynamic programming is also natural in this area. 
• Modeling the conflict situation. Notwithstanding questions regarding rationality (ofthe 
Attacker), game theory models may be incorporated to obtain efficient (threat, response 
options) matching. In particular, the question of whether or not publicly stating a 
response policy for a given threat has an impact on bioterrorist decision making can be 
analyzed. 0 
• Modeling the combat situation. The objective of the Attacker is to cause attrition to 
the Defender. The Defender will try to repel this attack by taking defensive measures 
(vaccinating, isolating) but also aggressive measures against the Attacker. This situation 
of mutual attrition is a classical combat situation and as such may be modeled by 
stochastic combat models (e.g., Lanchester Stochastic Models). The characteristics of 
the combat model depend on the type of the Attacker- individual, organization or state. 
• Logistics Management. For the logistics problem, standard OR models such as: 
inventory models, location models, assignment models, queuing models and 
transportation models are needed to be applied. Applications of these models must 
reflect the central and most profound feature of this bioterror situation- the race 
between the two time scales: the epidemic time and the logistics time. Tradeoffs between 
regimes such as ample service vs. (different levels of controlled) congestion must be 
quantitatively evaluated. 
Some more general and important comments should be added. Models need to be validated, but 
validation wont happen against real data very often (we hope!). Simulation or other more 
complex models can be used as a test bed to evaluate policies derived from simpler logistics 
models. We want to be able to revise/update our models, perhaps in real time, as data arrive (so 
self-evaluating systems, data assimilation are key aspects). Different models are appropriate for 
different threats. Some general models can be developed to apply to a variety of pathogens, but 
pathogen-specific models should incorporate specific threat/response pairings and relevant 
models of disease spread. Incorporating logistics into epidemic models changes standard results 
due to competitive time scales of epidemics and interventions. For example, epidemic outcomes 
differ greatly depending upon whether or not available response capabilities result in congestion. 
Suggestions for Getting Started 
To get started, we need to gain a feel for policy options and associated decisions, at both 
structural and operational levels, at different levels of jurisdiction (local, regional, state, federal). 
One approach is to treat existing plans for bioterror response as data, and review them with an 
eye towards creating an inventory of response logistics concerns. Since different threats require 
different responses, we could organize a binary matrix with threat possibilities along one 
dimension and response options along the other, to summarize threat/response matchings. It will 
help to consider existing bioterror response templates (structure of incident command, 
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detailing different agency responsibilities and chain of communication). It will also be useful to 
contrast civilian chains with military (the latter issue orders, operate privately; the former 
muddle through and act publicly). A different idea is to formulate an action/state matrix as 
suggested in Science (3/8/02, p. 1839). This would have states (high risk, low risk, safe) and 
actions (intensive intervention, monitoring/some restrictions, nothing), with payoffs (scaling 
from 0 (worst) to 1 (best) case). These approaches should help us to focus attention on key 
issues/decisions. The general principle is: \Vhen uncertainty is extensive, what really matters 
are the consequences of different actions. 
Challenges for the Mathematical Sciences 
Several branches of mathematical sciences are relevant, including (but not limited to): 
• Operations research (natural for logistics) 
• Mathematical epidemiology (natural for disease) 
• Probability and statistics (natural for uncertainties, parameter estimation) 
• Computer science (natural for more advanced computation) 
• Game theory (natural for modeling conflict) 
The key mathematical sciences challenge is to adapt modeling methods used for logistics in other 
fields to applications in bioterrorism defense. As noted earlier, the problem may not be to 
develop new methods so much as it is to adapt existing methods to new applications. The section 
on modeling challenges has described very specific challenges, namely to develop: 
• Information-theoretic models for estimating the time-dependent spatial probability 
distribution of susceptibles. 
• Bayesian prediction models and maximum likelihood models for estimating the probability. 
• Stochastic programming, chance-constrained programming, and dynamic programming 
methods for solving the two-stage problem of decision making required for bioterror attack 
defense. 
• Game-theoretic models to understand the threat/response pairings in conflict situations. 
• Stochastic combat models. 
• Applications of standard OR models such as inventory models, location models, assignment 
models, queuing models, and transportation models, with an emphasis on the tradeoffs 
between ample service vs. congestion. 
Recommendations 
• Mathematical modeling for bioten-or logistics should be developed and encouraged. 
• A cross-disciplinary approach is needed. 
• Collaboration between relevant decision makers (public health officials, first responders, 
political leaders/staff), public health professionals, and modelers is essential. 
• A federal agency should take the lead in advancing bioterror response logistics research, 
recognizing the multidisciplinary nature of the problems (Office of Homeland Security?) . 
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Report of DIMACS Discussion Group on Design of Disease Control Strategies (e.g., 
isolation, quarantine, vaccination, ) via Mathematical Modeling 
Group Members: 
Jean Marie Arduino, Merck ResearchDavid Banks, FDA 
John Bombardt, Institute for Defense Anaiyses 
Carlos Castille-Chavez, Cornell University 
Richard Ebright, Rutgers University 
John Glasser, CDC, Facilitator 
Karl Hadeler, University ofTuebingen, Germany 
Alun Lloyd, Institute for Advanced Study 
Ellis McKenzie, NIH, Facilitator 
Preliminaries 
Our discussions focused on models as tools for public policy decision making, within the 
following context: agent release, spread, detection, analysis (modeling), advice, and action. 
Models could be used to prepare for possible terrorist attacks, as well as to aid in responding 
optimally in real-time . 
We perceive this as an opportunity for direct service (i.e., to ensure optimal deployment of 
available resources in the event of attack) rather than the development of mathematical 
innovations only loosely inspired by policymaking need. Recognizing that simplicity always is a 
virtue, our sessions were dominated by discussions of possible means of identifying the simplest 
model that would address policy issues responsibly (other than anticipating questions and 
reducing realistic models via sensitivity analyses). 
We assumed that releases would be deliberate, and undertaken by intelligent, knowledgeable 
people. With smallpox, for instance, variolation generally produces a mild disease that 
nonetheless is infectious, enabling those variolated to move about places where susceptible 
people congregate. Terrorists are willing to blow themselves up, so surely they would risk 
variolation, which is only occasionally fatal. 
Nature of Threat 
The nature of threats affects the strategies that must be evaluated. Deliberately introduced 
pathogens differ from natural ones in some respects, offering special modeling challenges. We 
focused on smallpox, whose potential as a terrorist weapon has been described (in, e.g., J.B. 
Tucker, Scourge: the Once and Future Threat of Smallpox, Atlantic Monthly Press, 200 I), and 
recognize that our thoughts may apply less well to other pathogens . 
Introduced pathogens may be unfamiliar, and may become known only via observation during 
the early epidemic phase. They may be diseases that occur elsewhere, for which we have little 
native immunity (e.g., many tropical diseases in the Northern Hemisphere); natural or induced 
mutations may enhance virulence. With advances in molecular engineering technologies, a truly 
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determined and skilled adversary could tum even commensal microbes into weapons (see, e.g., 
Tim Beardsley s piece in Scientific American, 
http://www .sciam.com/ 1999/0499issue/0499infocus.html ). 
In their delivery of familiar pathogens, terrorists are not limited to the means by which they are 
or were transmitted naturally: for instance, smallpox (historically person-to-person, but also via 
scabs or fomites), pneumonic piague (respiratory), anthrax (aerosolized), and bioengineered 
influenza (presumably respiratory). Pathogens might be disseminated at a single or multiple 
sites, or over wide areas. The utility of historical experience in this context remains unclear. 
One response to these uncertainties might be to develop generic models with which to simulate 
the behavior of any agent or agent combination, given some idea of its properties. The most 
useful "model" for the kind of near-real time operational support needed would be essentially 
pathogen-independent. This appears tractable, given our collective experience modeling 
contagious diseases for which interventions exist, but see the Possible Modeling Approaches 
section below. 
Nature of Response 
Possible response strategies (more or less in order pre- and post-event), and other issues that 
should be considered include: 
• When the vaccine stockpile suffices (as it may now for smallpox given the discovery of 
additional vaccine), permitting purchase under informed consent 
• Vaccinating first responders and selected others pre-event (e.g., healthcare workers, bus 
drivers), becoming more inclusive as the risk increases 
• Targeting super-spreaders (people who are very infectious, or who have many contacts, 
possibly because they are highly mobile) 
• Isolating febrile or all contacts (including asymptomatic ones), quarantining households, 
schools, workplaces, neighborhoods, communities 
• Vaccinating contacts, locales (e.g., households, ), everyone 
• Initiating chemotherapy, if any exists and is available 
• Composite strategies (e.g., the contribution of population immunity, attained via mass 
vaccination or disease, to the success of search and containment at eliminating smallpox in 
South Asia [where Ro was high]) 
• Dealing with vaccine adverse events (via, e.g., vaccinia hyper-immune globulin, etc.) 
We realize that another group focused on response logistics. Nonetheless, when introductions 
suffice to overwhelm the ability to search for cases and vaccinate/isolate to contain spread, the 
need to switch strategies and vaccinate locally or even indiscriminately may be obvious and/or 
irrelevant (because public reaction may force the issue). It is not clear what these thresholds are, 
however, and on what else they may depend (e.g., R0, side effects ofvaccination, speed of 
propagation, etc.) . 
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Human Behavior 
Our most daunting challenge may be accounting for the behavior of terrorists before and during 
attacks and the behavior of victims and the general public afterwards. We should involve social 
scientists to anticipate behavior and increase the probability of people responding as directed. 
Appropriate modeling of index infections is extremely important, especially in bioterrorist 
scenarios (e.g., ifthey are terrorists). Attacks could involve anywhere from a few people up to 
many thousands, who might initially be localized (within a single city) or dispersed (throughout 
several). The non-uniform progression of index infections is another key influence on disease 
transmission and control strategies, particularly if unnaturally high doses affect progression. 
How might people respond to an act ofbioterrorism and to governmental disease control 
strategies? Because emergency declarations and federal responses affect state/local, community, 
and individual compliance, clear, panic-quelling, if not confidence-inspiring, instructions are 
interventions in themselves. How could such responses affect the implementation, and hence 
effectiveness, of control strategies? (The public's response to macroeconomic policies during 
deflationary or inflationary periods and the corresponding econometrics appears analogous.) 
Mathematical Challenges 
We make some comments about challenges facing us in the use of mathematical models. 
Analytical Tools for Transient Behavior 
Traditional mathematical approaches to the long-term behavior of epidemics and the persistence 
of endemic states (such as stability analysis near equilibria) will be of little value. Policymakers 
will need estimates of early transient behavior (number initially infected, cases per week, 
consequences of more or less efficient implementation of more or less timely vaccination and 
containment policies, probable outbreak durations, magnitudes, and costs under several 
scenarios). At present, few analytical tools are available for transients. Once developed, 
however, these would have other applications. 
Possible Modeling Approaches 
It is unlikely that any single model/approach could address all options or serve all purposes; 
furthermore, diversity enriches our appreciation of phenomena. The pros and cons of various 
mathematical models and methods should be considered, among which we discussed the 
following issues: 
Simple versus realistic: 
1. Simplicity facilitates communication, and parameters often can be estimated with 
precision, but the failure of realistic models (i.e., hypotheses about natural phenomena) can 
increase understanding; 
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2. The premise of applied population biology (i.e., epidemiology, demography) is that a 
relatively small number of characteristics (e.g., age) suffice to account for major patterns in 
disease. Models of populations composed oftypes (e.g., age groups, behavior classes, habitation 
densities) are relatively simple compared to ones composed of individuals; 
3. Superficial versus true complexity (e.g., a system of many ODEs may be no more 
complex than a few integra-differential equations or PDEs). 
Deterministic versus stochastic: 
(NB: The issue is not if God plays dice, but if policymakers need realistic confidence intervals. 
They do if results encompass more than one option being contemplated, or force consideration of 
others. The trick is finding ways of considering variances, rather than one-point answers, 
when these matter within this broad decision-focused framework.) 
1. Stochastic models are useful not only for confidence bounds, but information about the 
covariance of fluctuations enters into formulae for the mean (i.e., feedback into the calculation of 
mean values); 
2. Complex probabilistic approximations may reside within deterministic ODE models, 
as in mean-field determinations; 
3. Experience suggests that one can learn almost as much from proper sensitivity analysis 
of deterministic models (except close to bifurcations) as from stochastic ones; 
4. Stochastic models may distinguish between minor and major outbreaks (and false 
alarms). Because decision makers are especially sensitive to the risk of catastrophic events, this 
may be of great help in the wider context. 
Game-theoretic methods: 
These have great potential in decision-making contexts, especially in adversarial situations where 
opponents value costs and benefits differently (or there are different or changing cultural norms). 
Statistical risk analysis offers tools that estimate the payoffs needed as inputs to either the 
extensive or normal, tree or matrix, forms of two-person non-zero-sum games. What other 
mathematical tools and techniques would be useful in representing post-attack behavior across 
the spectrum of epidemic models (deterministic, stochastic, spatial, ... )? 
Data, Validation. and Sensitivity Analysis 
What data would be useful in developing and refining these models? And how would we know 
if our results were qualitatively incorrect? 
I. The NIAID has developed a Counter-Bioterrorism Research Agenda 
(http://www.niaid.nih.gov/dmidlpdf/biotresearchagenda.pdf) within which opportunities may 
exist for interaction/collaboration with scientists in other disciplines on studies to gather data 
useful for the development and evaluation of mathematical models. 
2. Decision makers may be familiar with modeling when full-scale testing is infeasible 
(of, e.g., nuclear weapons); can we validate models experimentally (e.g., using role-playing 
exercises as experiments to validate computer simulations with independently-generated data and 
parameters) as well as against historical data (that may or may not be wholly relevant)? 
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3. It may also be possible to validate simpler models by comparing them to more 
complex ones. For instance, deterministic models, using average values can duplicate the results 
of more complex stochastic models. 21 
4. Sensitivity to assumptions (e.g., whether spatial heterogeneity matters), as well as to 
parameter values, must be checked, as must the influence of initial conditions. 
Collegial Relations 
We discussed the extent to which modelers should cooperate versus compete, and most agreed 
that cooperation on important common topics (e.g., biological details, public policies being 
contemplated) was best, but that groups modeling in different ways (e.g., as sketched above) 
would provide a sort of global sensitivity analysis in a situation with too much uncertainty to· 
place proper confidence intervals on results of interest. 
1. By having such working groups, DIMACS provides a forum for modelers to critique 
one another s work without needlessly confusing policy-makers. Having quasi-independent 
groups model foot-and-mouth in the UK was particularly instructive. But what would have 
happened had conclusions differed, particularly with respect to their implications for policy? 
2. Could individual-level details in EpiSims (or superficially similar models, e.g., the one 
under development at Purdue) be mapped onto individual types (e.g., age groups) and the 
corresponding contact matrix be determined and provided to others for use in their simpler 
models? Similarly, could such information be obtained from proximity detectors, and similarly 
shared? 
A minority view was that a competition of the sort exemplified by bi-annual computational 
modeling of protein three-dimensional structure (CASP, Community Wide Experiment on the 
Critical Assessment of Techniques for Protein Structure Prediction; 
http://predictioncenter.llnl.gov/casp4/doc/casp4-announce.html) would improve the quality of 
our work. Other examples are the computational modeling of intermolecular interactions 
(CATFEE, Critical Assessment ofTechniques for Free Energy Evaluation; 
http://uqbar.ncifcrf.gov/-catfeeO and a recently announced blind test of protein docking 
algorithms (CAPRI, Critical Assessment of PRedicted Interactions; http://capri.ebi.ac.ukL). 
One member of our group opined that CASP s impact on computational approaches for protein 
structure prediction had been immense, that CA TFEE was expected to have a large impact too, 
and that an analogous competition could similarly affect development of epidemiological 
models. He imagined, for example, annual ranked competitions focused on prediction of each 
year's influenza and/or pneumonia outbreaks (predictions that would be assessed and ranked 
against subsequently available data) and annual un-ranked competitions focused on prediction of 
bioterror/biowarfare attacks (predictions that--one would hope--could not be similarly assessed 
and ranked) . 
21 See, for example, Longini, et. at., Math Biosci., 38 (1978), 141-157. 
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DIMACS Discussion Group on Challenges for Computer Science 
Group Members 
Adam Buchsbaum -- AT&T Labs 
Alok Chaturvedi --Purdue University (Rapporteur) 
Sorin Istrail -Celera Genomics 
William Mills -CIA 
Rafail Ostrovsky ---.:relecordia Technologies 
David Pennock- NEC Research Institute 
Fred Roberts- DIMACS/Rutgers University (Facilitator) 
Gary Strong- (NSF Observer) 
Michael Trahan -Sandia Labs 
Introduction 
In dealing with potential bioterrorist attacks, one can divide approaches into two categories: 
prevention and response. Approaches to prevention build heavily on surveillance, which in tum 
involves the handling and sharing of massive amounts of data, with concomitant threats to 
privacy?2 Approaches to response also include surveillance or detection (determining if a 
bioterrorist event is taking place is itself non-trivial). Response approaches typically include both 
advanced planning and crisis planning, and each heavily involves the use of mathematical 
models as tools to aid policy makers. Problems of surveillance, detection, massive data sets and 
data sharing, and computational support for mathematical models and decision makers all 
depend in important ways on methods of modem computer science. The development of 
improved methods of bioterrorism response and prevention presents new and important 
challenges to computer science research, which were the subject of this groups deliberations. 
The group discussed a wide variety of challenges for computer science and divided them into six 
categories, which will be described in this report. 
The six categories are: 
1. Simulation and Virtual Environments 
2. Data Base Policies and Information Exchange 
3. Intelligence and Detection 
4. Fault Tolerance 
5. Consequence Management 
6. Computational Molecular Biology 
22 Another major component of prevention involves understanding subtle and highly unstable social processes that 
provoke terrorism. This is a very important area for research that should involve computer scientists in partnership 
with social scientists. 
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Simulation and Virtual Environments 
It is infeasible to run real-world bioterrorism experiments to test the effectiveness of our 
surveillance systems or our response plans23 , or to validate our models of disease spread, social 
movement, or terrorist recruitment. It is therefore essential that we develop virtual environments 
for experimentation and anaiysis. 
Simulation is essential for understanding the implications of large transmission models and 
studying social interactions and social networks. Better and more efficient simulation methods 
are needed for the large agent-based and continuum models being developed to model disease 
transmission. 
Developing effective response strategies to a bioterrorist attack involves serious scenario 
planning. Such scenario planning is one of a variety of analytic decision theory aids heavily 
based in methods of simulation. Along with each scenario, the response model must be subject to 
verification, validation, and accreditation. These are all topics of modem computer science 
research, but new methods for them in virtual environments are called for. Simulation models are 
also helpful in forensics and in validating our theories about the cause of an event, akin to 
National Transportation Safety Board modeling experiments . 
Methods for deterring bioterrorist attacks depend upon models of competition between attacker 
and defender. These adversary models should be behavior-based and involve modem game-
theoretic aspects, often involving the kind of dynamic game situations of increasing interest in 
computer science research related to auctions and other e-commerce applications. 
Many methods of the mathematical sciences have been used in epidemic modeling and in 
response planning in military and domestic industrial contexts. These models include well-
known methods of operations research applied to inventory, distribution, task assignment, 
scheduling, etc. However, because of the large number of variables involved in realistic models 
ofbioterrorism attack and response, the associated algorithms don t always scale, and so 
challenges for modern computer science research involve issues of architecture and scalability. 
Data Base Policies and Information Exchange 
An important challenge to maintaining homeland security in general and to defending against 
bioterrorism in particular is to share information across multiple databases, either within or 
between organizations. The technical problems are exacerbated by the need to maintain privacy 
and security. The opposing goals of protection of sensitive information and the need for 
information exchanges among agencies or between databases lie at the intersection of some of 
the most challenging areas of research in modem computer science. 
Data sharing is complicated by such factors as differences in representation of information 
among the various databases and the low and error-prone quality of stored information caused by 
23 Or to evaluate the depth of our understanding of the causes of terrorism. 
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manual entry, lack of uniform standards for content and formats, data duplication, and 
measurement errors. This calls for new methods of data cleaning. The development of efficient 
coordination engines is also required. 
Databases may not be integrated wholesale but only mined for individual records or pieces of 
information, which calls for sophisticated methods to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availabiiity of information. A major chailenge to modem computer science is information 
exchange without revealing private data: to provide techniques for efficiently, accurately, and 
securely sharing information among multiple databases. 
Intelligence and Detection 
It is crucial to develop surveillance systems that will detect impending bioterrorist attacks in time 
for us to take preventive measures. Should such surveillance systems fail to predict an attack, 
they are still critical in helping us identify that an attack has taken place, since early detection is 
crucial in minimizing damage. Moreover, once evidence of a biological attack is observed, for 
example increased illness and death in an area, the actual nature of the attack might still remain 
elusive. Methods for detecting and identifying biological attacks are thus critical. Intelligence 
and detection thus provides means to discover and report abnormal or undesirable events, such as 
biological attacks: before an attack occurs (detecting preparations for an attack); during or 
immediately thereafter (identifying that an attack has occurred and the nature of the attack); and 
during the response period (assessing the effectiveness of the response and facilitating 
heightened surveillance for subsequent attacks). 
Important challenges for computer science lie in all aspects of the intelligence and detection 
problem. Data mining is a central tool of detection. Challenges in data mining include the 
development of new methods of data cleaning, dimension reduction, visualization of data, and 
the development of spatial temporal models. Methods of streaming data analysis, widely under 
development for dealing with computer network intrusion, credit card fraud, and financial 
decision making, are needed for surveillance systems that are to respond quickly to 
abnormalities. Since many reports to surveillance systems involve natural language, new 
challenges to natural language processing also arise. Related problems of detection will also 
require new methods for classification/clustering in high dimension spaces, new tools for 
pattern discovery, and new algorithms for signal detection in the presence of noise. In tum, these 
methods already do and in the future will increasingly make use of learning theory to classify 
new data and signal the arrival of a new event. Challenges in learning theory include 
development of new machine learning protocols and of hidden Markov models. 
As we develop surveillance systems, we will want to use computer models to help locate 
distributed sensors and interpret data from them. We might also wish to use the Internet as a 
sensor/communication device in our efforts to develop methods of global change detection. 
Methods of biometrics provide another potentially useful detection tool. 
• Fault Tolerance 
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In defense against bioterrorist attacks, functionalities that can operate under malicious, 
coordinated attack and nevertheless remain robust and secure are essential. We must build our 
bioterrorism defense systems, such as surveillance systems, vaccine or prophylaxis distribution 
systems, emergency communications systems, etc., to be reliable even if they consist of 
unreliable components. 
Redundancy has traditionally been the fundamental mechanism for ensuring reliability. 
Increasingly, traditional approaches to using redundancy are not applicable to modem networked 
environments. Today s computer and communications networks rely more and more on loosely 
coupled, off-the-shelf hardware and software systems, which exhibit extremely complex fault 
behaviors that must be masked via large-scale redundancy. The mathematical formalisms, tools, 
and methodologies for dealing with this situation need to be developed. 
Fault tolerance cannot be an afterthought. Rather, it must be an essential ingredient of system 
design from the beginning. This is also true of security, which is crucial to our surveillance 
systems and the development of our response plans. Security is just one aspect of the need to 
defend against an unknown or only partially known adversary. Game-theoretic models can help 
us identify promising policies; methods developing concepts and implementations of game-
theoretic fault-tolerance will be very helpful. 
Our complex, interconnected agricultural systems and our modern, high-speed, inter-city 
transportation system leave us vulnerable to biological attacks. Ever more powerful methods for 
assessment of vulnerability are needed. 
Our response mechanisms will increasingly build on sophisticated computer models. To use 
them, we will need to maintain computation under continuous attack. 
Consequence Management 
Another group has dealt with the various aspects of plans for responding to a bioterrorist attack. 
We need tools for such consequence management, both to help us develop advance plans and 
test them, and to help us modify these plans in a crisis situation. In short, we need tools to assist 
crisis managers deal with any eventuality. 
Informatioa is a key to modern warfare. Information dissemination will be a key to 
consequence management, and a major challenge to computer science will be to develop ways to 
disseminate information in a distributed environment, with potentially unreliable systems, and 
with speed, efficiency, and security. Communication among the many individuals and agencies 
involved in a response to a bioterrorist attack is essential, and we shall have to develop ever 
better robust ad hoc communication networks. 
The plans we develop for a response will be intricate and involve strategies and models for 
mobilization, stockpiling, isolation, vaccination, quarantine, etc. These strategies and models 
will have to be developed for testing in a virtual environment, and the users of the models will 
have to be supplied with highly efficient computational tools for modifying their models on the 
basis of developing situations. 
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Computational Molecular Biology 
Computational molecular biology provides computational tools for molecular data analysis, 
design of predictive models, and bio agent identification. 
Phylogenetic methods -developing the tree of life - are a central tool in modem 
computational biology. These methods are important in strain detection, an important task in 
identifying the source of agents used in bioterrorist attacks. Phylogenetic methods help to 
identify the subtype of the organism and then can potentially indicate from which lab it is 
coming. This requires computationally intense analyses that would benefit from the development 
of new methods and algorithms. 
Methods of computational biology, usingfinger printing and computational genetics, also hold 
promise in distinguishing bioterrorist dissemination from natural dissemination, a crucial 
distinction, and in predicting the evolution ofbioterrorist agents . 
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Group Members24 
Simon Levin, Princeton University (Facilitator) 
Lora Billings, Montclair State University 
Michael Boechler, Innovative Emergency Management (Writer) 
Keith Cooper, Rutgers University 
Donald Hoover, Rutgers University 
Mai Nguyen, Central Intelligence Agency 
Michael Steuerwalt, (NSF Observer) 
Stephen Tennenbaum, Cornell University (Rapporteur) 
Focus 
The discussion of our group ranged across a number of issues associated with protection of the 
country s agriculture industry. Our definition of the industry was intended to be inclusive of 
forestry and aquaculture within which we primarily considered issues related to the food supply, 
as opposed to those that may involve ecosystem damage but not significantly affect the food 
consumed by humans25• 
• Background 
• 
Agriculture is a significant com~onent of the economy, accounting for approximately 2% of the 
nations gross domestic product 6• A terrorist attack on it could result in enormous direct effects 
on the industry targeted, on their dependent consumer markets and throughout the entire food 
chain resulting in adverse events throughout the entire world economy. The costs of repair 
responses and a posteriori control measures to prevent future attacks would prove high in a 
possibly panicked atmosphere. Historical records of the massive impact of crop failures with 
resulting mass starvation and migration are indicative of the potential scale of these problems. 
Examples of this include the Irish Potato Blight, famines in Ethiopia, and the dust bowl of the 
1930 s. 
Such a devastating attack could result in the disruption of normal activities and peace of mind as 
well as food lines, uncertainty, erosion of public confidence, and fear. These effects could, in 
turn, result in persistent or permanent changes in domestic culture or international relations27 . 
Attacks on agriculture could have major impacts on food availability if aimed at crops or 
livestock directly, resulting in nutritional problems and increased vulnerability to disease"or other 
24 The group thanks Mark Thurmond, University of California, Davis, for helpful input. 
25 Attacks on agricultural areas could be easily orchestrated and result in wide-scale, persistent ecological 
consequences. However, attacks could be just as costly but maintain a low profile, for example the effects of an 
introduction of weedy species or pests (e.g. Gypsy Moths) could be difficult or impossible to control but have little 
sensational impact. 
26 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbooklgeos/us.html 
21 For example, if contaminated food were exported. 
May 17,2002 35 
• 
• 
forms of attack on humans. Food safety would be compromised if agents were deployed that 
produced or contained toxins, or if toxins were introduced into the foods directly from within the 
food processing system. Posing a smaller threat, the possibility of livestock, fisheries or wildlife 
being used as vectors or secondary hosts for disease transmission to humans also exists. 
Current agricultural practices and trends such as the increasing genetic homogeneity of crops, 
large geographic expanses of monocultures, isolation, as well as difficulties in surveillance and 
detection, coupled with the potential use of low tech, low cost and self perpetuating biological 
agents could make agriculture and the food supply a particularly attractive target to terrorists. In 
addition, as new technologies continue to revolutionize agribusiness, future pressure from these 
changes could foster targeted forms of ecoterrorism in which particular crop strains are targeted. 
Contamination Problems 
The most salient example of contamination of an agricultural product is perhaps the occurrence 
of bovine spongiform encephalopathy, more colloquially known as mad cow disease among 
European livestock. More recently, British problems with foot and mouth disease have garnered 
attention in the media which reported on the speed of the contagion, and the difficulties officials 
encountered in attempting to contain, control, and eradicate the disease. 
Posing problems for the beef industry are recurrent incidents of E. coli-contaminated ground beef 
resulting in deaths and large scale recalls, while the contamination of corn crops intended for 
human consumption by genetically engineered, and toxic, strains did little to further the cause of 
those who promote the use of genetically modified crops. 
Perhaps the most relevant, and notorious, food or drug contamination example involves the 
Tylenol® tampering that occurred in 1982. Even though only a handful of containers were 
contaminated with cyanide, large recalls of the product, and public distrust of it, meant large 
financial losses for the company. 
Motivated by these considerations, we turn our attention throughout the rest of this report to 
some of the attributes of a framework that could be used to prepare for or to counter events in 
which an agent is used by a terrorist to contaminate food or drug products. This is followed by an 
identification of the significant challenges for the mathematics and computer sciences 
communities in implementing such a counterterrorism framework. 
Counterterrorism Framework 
In order to minimize the risks associated with a terrorist attack two objectives should be 
accomplished: the probability of the attack should be decreased through deterrence, and the 
attacks consequences should be minimized. The first objective requires that adequate capability 
exists to predict the terrorist attack. The second requires that, when the attack occurs, the crisis 
• caused by it, and its consequences, are optimally managed. 
May 17,2002 36 
• 
• 
• 
Event prediction and deterrence, crisis management and consequence management can all be 
aided through the use of mathematical models and simulation. Each of these components offers 
opportunities and challenges to the quantitative modeling community. 
Prediction 
Minimizing potential impacts of a terrorist attack is accomplished by predicting, then deterring 
the attack. Prediction depends on intelligence regarding the terrorist s capabilities, motivations, 
wiilingness to act and perception of his target s vulnerabilities. This suggests that systematic 
vulnerability assessments should be done in order to better understand and remedy critical 
weaknesses in the current agribusiness, food and drug protection infrastructures. 
Vulnerability assessments should include assumptions that areas of large monocultures exist and 
that some crop species are highly inbred, hybrid, or genetically specialized. Plants are 
particularly vulnerable to pathogens since resistance to disease is often dependent on a handful of 
genes. This implies that the genetic engineering of pathogens could potentially circumvent innate 
plant protection. These areas of monocultures and the types of organisms raised within them 
should be comprehensively catalogued as part of the vulnerability assessment. 
Especially contagious or difficult to control diseases should be identified and ranked with respect 
to risk. Some likely candidates include: Foot and Mouth Disease, Avian Influenza, Newcastle 
Disease, Bluetongue, African Horse Disease, Tuberculosis, Brucellosis, Potato Blight, Classical 
Swine Fever, and Mad Cow Disease . 
Zoonoses and vector borne diseases may also be of some concern in assessing vulnerability. 
Some example include: Tuberculosis, West Nile Virus, Dengue Virus, Malaria, Avian 
Encephalitis, Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, Lyme Disease. 
In terms of terrorist capability, there are a host of potential agents that could be used in an attack. 
Chemical, biochemical or radiological agents could be employed. Microparasites such as 
viruses, bacteria, fungi could be used, as could macroparasites such as protozoans, worms and 
other invertebrates or algae. And, as mentioned above, pests such as weeds, insects, or 
competitor species could be used. 
Finally, it should be assumed that outbreaks dependent on environmental conditions will be of 
lesser concern as a mechanism for minimizing the consequences of these outbreaks exists 
naturally and at no cost to the target. 
Identifying the terrorists immediate goals will be important for predicting their actions. Specific 
terrorist goals might include: 
• Death, pain, or disablement of people or entire populations 
• Economic damage- Producers of agricultural products face an additional 
ecoterrorist threat in addition to the background terrorist threat 
• Military disablement 
• Social disruption 
• Coercion 
• 
• 
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A number of analytical techniques should be applied to the problem of predicting an 
agriterrorism attack. Mapping of monoculture regions and the distribution of crop types can-be 
aided through the use of geographical information systems (GIS). Risk analytic techniques can 
be applied to calculate the degree to which various sectors of the food industry are vulnerable to 
exploitation and at what technological cost to the terrorist. 
An examination from the terrorist s perspective might involve application of operations research 
techniques such as those employed in foraging theory. In this case, they could be applied to the 
terrorist s choice of attack opportunities. Predator-prey models might be adapted and applied to 
the arms race between terrorist and counterterrorist strategies. Since these models are primarily 
descriptive rather than strategic, game-theoretic approaches, modeling the competition between 
attacker and defender, might be more useful. 28 
Little quantitative modeling and simulation has been done in the areas of persuasion, influence 
and action initiation. Models of these phenomena could be of use in predicting the antecedents of 
terrorist action or in decreasing the probability that such action will occur. 
Challenges for Prediction: 
There are a number of particularly difficult issues that are raised when considering the prediction 
of terrorist actions. There is the possibility of multiple attacks across large geographic regions . 
Multiple organisms could be simultaneously targeted in order to synergize the effects of each 
attack. Attacks could occur with multiple agents, possibly coordinated to specifically 
compromise detection and/or response systems. New sophisticated models that account for these 
possibilities will need to be developed. 
Deterrence 
The best way to respond to a terrorist threat is to deter the threat from reaching its destructive 
potential. Preventive measures to protect agricultural products should be implemented so that the 
adverse consequences of any terrorist attack can be minimized. One of the best ways to deter the 
action is to decrease the amount of damage that it can cause. In the present case, this means that 
agricultural methods should be adopted so that food crops are less susceptible to disease 
outbreaks or pest infestations. 
Some of the a priori preventive measures that might be considered include encouraging genetic 
heterogeneity in crops,29 intercropping and diversifying crop types at the landscape level, using 
buffer zones between genetically similar crops or reserves, or by reducing the mobility of crops 
and animals by requiring an observation/quarantine period before transport. 
These preventive measures could be made more effective if a more complete understanding of 
the conditions that precede and compel terrorist activity was obtained. Such an understanding 
would suggest additional strategies that might take advantage of the a priori measures that have 
been implemented . 
28 In these models, we might assume that the perpetrator of an attack will also consider our response to his actions. 
211 Costs, such as profit loss, might be offset by government payments to farmers and agribusinesses. 
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Challenges for Deterrence: 
The measures we have suggested for reducing the damage that can be sustained in an attack 
would, in many cases, represent a significant and costly departure from current agricultural 
practice. Determining the cost effectiveness of the economic solutions needed in order to 
implement these a priori measures would require a significant amount of modeling. In addition, 
accurate and useful models of terrorist beliefs and behaviors would require a great deal of 
modeling. 
Crisis Management 
The well-organized management of a complex crisis such as an agricultural terrorist attack 
depends on the timely receipt of accurate information. This information needs to be obtained and 
transmitted quickly once the event starts and must be made available in an understandable format 
so that decision makers can best act upon it. 
The information systems employed should allow decision makers to simulate possible event 
outcomes and to explore the expected effects of different response strategies on these outcomes. 
These systems should also be able to maintain false positive identification of threats at a low 
level in order to maintain credibility and to prevent civic disruption by the system itself . 
In addition, in cases of response resource shortfalls, decision makers should beble to optimally 
allocate scarce materials or personnel. Such a set of integrated surveillance and response systems 
would represent a significant increase in our capability to minimize the negative consequences of 
agricultural terrorist attacks. 
The group thought that it was necessary to focus at a system level in order to best manage any 
response to a terrorist attack and made the following observations regarding the design and 
characteristics of a planning, surveillance and response system. 
An effective and coordinated surveillance system for reporting, response and decision making 
would be designed for redundancy and would screen and categorize suspicious events triggering 
more intense surveillance. 
The design should allow hierarchical system responses, much like an immune system model, in 
which distinctions would be created between global versus local response, and a diversity of 
response options, that allow for the evolution of a strategy to best meet the need of a given 
situation, would be available. This feature would likely involve the incorporation of adaptive 
behavior into the system and should allow analysts to .find the most appropriate levels of 
flexibility and robustness in the system. 
Modeling for an effective response should be done at the system level but should also 
incorporate disparate high resolution models in order to increase realism. Various biological, 
physical, economic, demographic, social and transportation system models should be integrated 
in the design, modeling and analysis of this proposed adaptive surveillance system. 
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One of the first steps toward building such a system is a clear description of each threat it is 
expected to detect. All known pathogens and pests should be described with respect to 
transmission characteristics, incubation times, dose-response characteristics, and early signs and 
symptoms of infection. The acquisition ofthis information could be facilitated by employing 
several disease subject matter experts for each agent. These experts, who should be willing to 
provide uncertainty estimates for their opinions, can provide the biological insight and facts to 
indicate the iimitations of our knowledge. 
These experts should also be able to help conceptualize the key questions, provide estimates for 
some parameter values and provide an understanding of the general shape of distributions or 
functions that are relevant. They also can provide a comprehensive list of colleagues who can 
further elaborate on the expert opinion database where objective, empirical data are lacking or 
insufficient for modeling. 
The proposed system should contain a map for each agent indicating the farm-to-fork pathway, 
including sites or opportunities for food supply contamination. This would involve elucidating 
the steps, locations, contacts, vehicles, and people involved in moving food or water from the 
ground to the kitchen. Population maps, including GIS and other spatial distributions of 
population and food sources, should be incorporated, as should topographical maps showing 
streams and tributaries that contribute to domestic water supplies, and maps of underground 
water tapped by wells . 
The system would include descriptions of the available diagnostic tests and testing procedures 
for each pest or pathogen, including the sensitivity and specificity of each test. 30 
The vaccination (or other prophylactic measure) options for protecting vulnerable species should 
be systematically described in terms of efficacy, cost and availability31 , time to immune response 
and protection, and duration of protection. 
The various organizational structures, plans, and procedures of the State and Federal agency 
programs responsible for monitoring and surveillance of food safety should be described such 
that modeling of governmental response can be addressed. 32 A detailed analysis of current 
response plans and procedures might involve operations research methods such as the program 
evaluation and review technique (PERT), which can be used to streamline critical processes 
employed during the response to an outbreak. 
Finally, expert knowledge of agribusiness industry operations and food safety biology would be 
critical to assuring that the knowledge base of the proposed surveillance and response system is 
complete, and that the systems that fall within these domains are adequately described. 
:l<l That is, the probability of correctly identifying a disease if present, and the probability of falsely identifying the 
• 
~resence of disease if truly absent, respectively. 
· 
1 The time required to manufacture and distribute the vaccines would be quite useful. 
32 This model would contain the strategic nodes identified for typical food safety problems as well as those used in 
response to a terrorist attack. 
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Challenges for Crisis Management: 
A number of methodological hurdles must be overcome during the design of the proposed 
system. For example, the statistical methods to detect outliers require refinement- predicting rare 
events is difficult, predicting events that have never occurred is even more so. 
The source reconstruction problem exists as it does when considering response to biological 
weapons directed at humans. This problem becomes thornier when muitipie release sources and 
times are considered. This implies that more sophisticated spatiotemporal models will need to be 
developed. 
Assembling models to build a hierarchical immune system would be a particularly complex 
task. Although the times allowed to make decisions are longer during an agriterrorism crisis than 
during, say, a terrorist attack involving nerve agents, the complexity of the surveillance and 
response system would be great enough that the computing resources needed to implement the 
system would bear close examination and planning. 
Crisis management involves a great many logistical problems of manpower, inventory, 
distribution, and scheduling. Traditional operations research methods need to be modified to 
apply to bioterrorist crisis management. 
Finally, although conceptual frameworks for human decision making under stress exist within 
the social sciences, adequate quantitative models do not. Suboptimal decision making behavior 
occurred during the recent biowarfare exercises TOPOFF and Dark Winter, implying that 
information is not being processed effectively by those responsible for coordinating and directing 
official responses to a biowarfare attack. Faithfully capturing these decision making processes 
and optimizing them will be an important challenge. 
Consequence Management 
A more complete and accurate estimate of the potential consequences of an agricultural attack 
must be obtained in order for the proposed system to be of any utility. Anticipated consequences 
such as contamination, disease outbreaks, displacement, as well as economic and psychological 
impacts should be incorporated into the system as outcome variables, and should be used as 
indicators of decision making performance during policy and response exercises. 
Once these currencies for optimizing decisions have been specified, adequate consequence 
management planning will require the use of scenarios that take into account the geographic and 
spatial aspects of the incident, pathogen or pest persistence and evolution/co-evolution of the 
pathogen and host, in addition to the considerations discussed above. 
Approaches currently exist for countering invading species and would likely be most 
representative of those used to deal with the aftermath of a terrorist attack targeting agricultural 
products. They include the following types of control: chemical, biological control, mechanical 
and habitat-based. The cost effectiveness of each type of control measure available to decision 
makers should be examined, as should the development of new control options. 
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Challenges for Consequence Management: 
More options for consequence management need to be generated- destroying large amounts of 
agricultural products in order to halt an advancing pathogen is wasteful and disruptive. 
The important dimensions on which planning scenarios are based should be developed. If these 
dimensions are chosen carefully, a comprehensive set of scenarios could be derived in a manner 
that assures adequate representation of the relevant policy and planning space. 
Brin2in2 in Human Factors 
One of the most significant long term challenges to the mathematics and modeling community, is 
the problem of constructing the types of human behavior models that are needed for the proposed 
system. To date, no comprehensive mathematical treatment ofthe transmission of ideas has been 
offered, although some initial thoughts on the properties accounted for by such theory have been 
expressed by Dennett33. A mathematical treatment of the spread of culture was developed by 
Boyd and Richerson34 in a manner familiar to population biologists, while Lumsden and 
Wilson35 have examined gene-culture coevolution mathematically, and Feldman and Cavalli-
Sforza36 have also taken an evolutionary point of view, but this work needs to be extended and 
modified to suit the needs of the range of new problems facing the country . 
A number of mathematical approaches might be incorporated into a comprehensive treatment of 
human communication and behavior. Epidemiological models might be used to model the spread 
of an idea much like that of a disease. Belief systems might be considered as immune systems -
for example, particular belief systems may be quite resistant to the incorporation of new 
information, especially if that information conflicts with the belief system. Epidemiological 
models would be best applied when examining questions that are applicable at the group or 
population level 
Other group-level phenomena that need'to be addressed are those associated with decision 
making within bureaucracies. Responding to the types of threats discussed in this report requires 
the coordination of many governmental agencies embedded within a national to local hierarchy 
that is responsive to public opinion and the influence of special interests. Network models 
adapted from the computer sciences might be used to address this aspect of the problem. 
On the other hand, models borrowed from information theory would most likely have a place 
within the mathematical framework when analysis of individual-level communication of ideas is 
needed. Other mathematical models of individual choice from the econometrics tradition might 
be similarly applicable for modeling at this level, as may those borrowed from the cognitive 
sciences in order to link ideas to behavior . 
JJ Dennett, D. 1995. Darwin's dangerous idea 
:w Boyd, Rand Richerson, P. 1976. Culture and the evolutionary process 
J~ Lumsden, C. and Wilson, E. 0. 1981. Genes, mind and culture: the coevolutionary process. 
36 Feldman, M.W., and Cavalli-Sforza, L.L., 1989, Evolutionary theory. 
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Human language and behavior are among the most complex systems observed. There is no 
compelling reason to expect that a simple elegant mathematical model of these phenomena 
exists. The construction of a rigorous framework to explain or predict observed patterns of idea 
diffusion will likely be a lengthy, difficult endeavor. However, since so much of the complexity 
present in the real world relevant to the problem of defense against agriterrorism is due to human 
behavior, any comprehensive end-to-end treatment of the problem will be insufficient until such 
a mathematical struct1.1re is complete. 
Summary of Challenges for the Mathematical Sciences 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Develop ways to model multiple attacks across large geographic regions . 
Develop models for predicting the impact of attacks by multiple agents and for detecting 
such attacks. 
Apply risk analysis to calculate the degree to which various sectors of the food industry are 
vulnerable to agriterrorist attack. 
Develop game-theoretic models for the competition between attacker and defender . 
Develop mathematical models to determine the cost effectiveness of deterrence strategies 
that depart from current agricultural practice. 
Apply simulation methods to information systems designed to aid decision makers in crisis 
management. 
Find new statistical methods to detect outliers, to be used in models predicting rare events . 
Create more sophisticated spatio-temporal models for the source reconstruction problem 
when multiple release sources and times are considered. 
Adapt operations research methods of scheduling, manpower, inventory, and distribution . 
Develop quantitative models to aid human decision making under stress . 
Modify quantitative methods for determining the cost-effectiveness of alternative control 
measures. 
Adapt network models from computer science to address problems of coordination among 
multiple government agencies . 
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Report of DIMACS Discussion Group on Agent-based and Differential Equation Models 
for Transition Dynamics 
Group Members 
Fred Brauer, University of Wisconsin 
Derek Cumlllings, The JohiJ.s Hopkins University 
Robert V. Duncan, University ofNew Mexico 
Mac Hyman, Los Alamos National Labs (facilitator) 
Tom Kepler, Santa Fe Institute 
Shailendra Raj Mehta, Purdue University 
Roseanna M. Neupauer, University of Virginia 
Ira B. Schwartz, Naval Research Labs 
Carl Simon, University of Michigan 
Eduardo Sontag, Rutgers University 
Goals of Modeline 
A major goal of modeling in epidemiology and public health is to understand and provide 
feasible forecasts for: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Estimating the degree to which a disease will spread; 
Understanding the early history of an outbreak; 
Assessing the impact of proposed interventions; 
Optimizing the impact of prevention strategies; 
Improving our understanding of risk factors; 
Assessing the effectiveness of partial protection . 
In addition, models provide a solid mathematical framework for analysis and prediction. 
Moreover, they can be used to improve the design of surveillance systems. 
Modeling Techniques 
Modeling techniques in epidemiology can be distinguished in various ways: Are they continuum 
or agent-based? Are they deterministic or stochastic? What is the degree of heterogeneity (space, 
age, risk, susceptibility, infectivity, contact structure, ). Are they single resolution or 
multiresolution? 
The group emphasized the distinction between continuum and agent-based models and discussed 
their positive and negative features in general and in the bioterrorism context. 
Agent-based models are formulated in terms of the characteristics of and interactions among 
individuals. The resulting emergent behavior of the system determines the course of the epidemic 
and the effectiveness of control strategies . 
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Continuum models are formulated in terms of a dynamical system describing the distribution of a 
(possibly heterogeneous) population. The resulting emergent behavior of the system again 
determines the course of the epidemic and the effectiveness of control strategies. 
Features of Continuum Models 
The positive features of continuum models are: 
• Analyzable (based on a rich theoretical foundation) 
• Sensitivity Analysis (forward and backward) is readily performed 
• Model is defined in terms of available population based parameters 
• Efficient prediction of mean behavior in the presence of low amplitude noise 
The negative features are: 
• Severe limitation on the dimension of the state space (age, risk, susceptibility) 
• Poor information about low probability events (tails of distributions) 
• Model cannot handle individual level behavior 
Features of Aeent-based Models 
The positive features of agent-based models are: 
• Few limitations on the dimension of the state space (age, risk, susceptibility) 
• Good information about low probability events (tails of distributions) 
• Model directly incorporates individual level behavior 
The negative features are: 
• Few analytical tools (nascent theoretical foundations) 
• No backward sensitivity analysis 
• Individual level data often has to be derived from population level data 
• Computationally less efficient than continuum model 
In a bioterrorist context, the positive features, such as incorporating individual level behavior, 
could be important. But the paucity of analytical tools and the inefficiency of existing 
computational methods provide challenges to mathematical scientists in order to make these 
types of models useful in the bioterrorist context, at least in the response phase when response 
time is critical. 
Challenees for the Mathematical Sciences 
Such models are already widely used in understanding the spread of various kinds of diseases. 
Modification of them in a bioterrorist context will require the development of special features. 
However, it should not require the development of fundamentally new modeling tools. Still, 
there are some important specific challenges for the mathematical sciences: 
• Develop improved tools for understanding geographic spread 
• Find ways to mutually calibrate agent-based and continuum models 
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• Improve significantly the efficiency of computational methods (both software and 
hardware) for using these models. 
• Develop new techniques to evaluate and establish confidence in simulations. 
Forward sensitivity analysis using techniques such as tangent linear methods 
Backward sensitivity analysis to answer how come questions. 
• Develop probabilistic models to improve our capabilities of predicting epidemics where 
there are only a few infected people. 
• Design new approaches to quantify the uncertainty and suitability of models for the 
transmission of infectious diseases. 
In order for these types of tools to become useful in a bioterrorist context will require improved 
communication between the mathematical sciences community and the public health community 
on the role of models . 
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Appendix I 
DIMACS Working Group Meeting on Mathematical Sciences Methods for the Study of 
Deliberate Releases of Biological Agents and their Consequences 
March 22: 
8:00- 8:50 
8:50-9:10 
First meeting, March 22- 23, 2002 
DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ 
Breakfast and Registration 
Opening Remarks 
Fred Roberts 
Director ofDIMACS and co-Chair of meeting 
James Flanagan 
Vice President for Research, Rutgers University 
John Tesoriero 
Executive Director, NJ Commission on Science and Technology 
Carlos Castillo-Chavez 
Cornell University and co-Chair of meeting 
Talks: all talks are 15 minutes, with 5 minutes for discussion 
Talk Session I (Modeling): 
9:10-9:30 
9:30-9:50 
Ellis McKenzie, NIH 
Making Models Make Sense to Policy-makers 
Peter Merkle, Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
Biological Modeling and Support to Operations 
9:50 - I 0: 10 John Glasser, CDC 
May 17,2002 
(Joint presentation with M. Reynolds, M.l. Meltzer, B. Schwartz, J.M. Lane, 
S.O. Foster, J.D. Millar and W.A. Orenstein) 
Optimal Response to Deliberate Reintroduction of Smallpox: Design via 
Mathematical Modeling 
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I 0: I 0- I 0:30 Lone Simonsen, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 
(NIAID), NIH 
The Need for Mathematical Models to Make Better Public Health Decisions: A 
Few Examples from the World of Influenza Pandemic Planning 
l 0:30- 10:50 BREAK 
Talk Session II (Biosurveillance): 
10:50 - 11:10 Richard Heffernan, NYC Department of Health 
Syndromic Surveillance ofEmergency Department Visits, New York City 
11:10- 11:30 Teresa Hamby, NJ Department ofHealth & Senior Services 
Challenges in NJ' s Ongoing Surveillance: A Discussion of Current Activities 
11:30- 11:50 Marcello Pagano, Harvard University 
(Joint presentation with Marco Bonetti, Karen Olson and Kenneth D. Mandl) 
Analyzing Bio-surveillance Data to Increase Vigilance to Bio-terrorism 
11:50- 12:10 Henry Rolka, CDC 
Data Mining in Public Health: Issues and Challenges 
12:10- 12:30 David Madigan, Rutgers University 
Some Aspects of Adverse Events Detection 
12:30- 1:30 LUNCH 
Talk Session III (Biosurveillance, continued): 
1:30-1:50 
1:50-2:10 
Jim Koopman, University of Michigan 
Basing Surveillance On Infection Transmission System Theory Rather Than 
Sampling Theory 
Ira B. Schwartz, Naval Research Laboratory 
Mathematical Problems in Biological and Chemical Sensors 
• Talk Session IV (Mathematical Sciences Tools and Approaches): 
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2: I 0- 2:30 
2:30- 2:50 
2:50-3:10 
3:10-3:30 
3:30-3:50 
Gary Strong, NSF 
The Role of Computer Science in the Defense Against Bioterrorism 
Edward Kaplan, Yale University 
(Joint presentation with David Craft and Larry Wein) 
Modeling Bioterror Response Logistics: The Case of Smallpox 
Karl Hadeler, University ofTuebingen 
The Role of Migration and Contact Distributions in the Spread of Deliberately 
Released Infectious Agents 
Simon Levin, Princeton University 
Mathematical Challenges Posed by Bioterrorism 
Mac Hyman, Los Alamos National Lab 
Comparing and Combining Agent Based and Differential Equation Models for the 
Spread of Epidemics 
3:50-4:10 
4:10-6:30 
BREAK 
Discussion Group Session I 
Discussion groups meet separately 
Discussion Groups: 
The meeting will start with short talks on Friday morning. By late afternoon, we plan to break 
into "brainstorming groups" to discuss the role ofmethods of the mathematical sciences in the 
defense against bioterrorist attacks. The groups will continue their discussions on Saturday 
morning, drafting brief "white papers" on their topic. We will then ask each group to summarize 
their conclusions to the entire meeting. 
Discussion Group List: Group Topics and Leaders: 
Design of Control Strategies 
(Combined Modeling Control and Design of Isolation and Vaccination Strategies via 
Mathematical Modeling) 
Leader: Ellis McKenzie and John Glasser 
Location: Seminar Room (4th Floor, CoRE 431) 
Modeling and Evaluating Bioterrorism Emergency Response Logistics 
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Leader: Ed Kaplan 
Location: Conference Room (4th Floor, CoRE 433) 
Biosurveillance 
Leader: Marcello Pagano 
Location: CoRE A (3rd Floor, CoRE 301) 
Modeling Transmission Dynamics with Agent-Based and Differential Equations Models 
Leader: Mac Hyman 
Location: CAIP 601 (6th Floor, CoRE) 
Challenges for Computer Science 
Leader: Fred Roberts 
Location: CAIP 626 (6th Floor, CoRE) 
Agriculture and Food Supply 
Leader: Simon Levin 
Location: CAIP 726 (7th Floor, CoRE) 
Evolution 
Leader: James Koopman 
Location: Office 404 (4th Floor, CoRE) 
6:30 Reception at DIMACS 
7:15 Banquet at DIMACS 
March 23: 
8:00- 8:40 Breakfast 
Talk Session V (Networks, Ideologies, Game Theory, Discrete Math): 
8:40- 9:00 David Banks, FDA 
Risk Analysis and Game Theory 
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9:00 - 9:20 Alun L. Lloyd, Institute for Advanced Study 
(Joint presentation with Ira Schwartz, Naval Research Lab and Lora Billings, 
Montclair State University and NRL) 
Disease Spread on Networks: Analogies Between Biological and Computer 
Viruses 
9:20 - 9:40 Carlos Castillo-Chavez, Cornell University 
Core Groups, Cooperative Behavior and Peer Pressure: The Dynamics of 
Fanaticism by Ultra-ideologically Driven Individuals 
9:40- 10:00 Fred S. Roberts, DIMACS, Rutgers University 
Challenges for Discrete Mathematics and Theoretical Computer Science 
10:00- 10:15 Break 
1 0: 15 - 12: 15 Discussion Group Session II 
• Discussion groups meet, prepare drafts of white papers and prepare presentations to the full 
group. Same meeting rooms as before. 
• 
12:15-1:15 LUNCH 
1: 15 - 4:00 Plenary Session: Discussion Group Presentations 
Each group will have 1 0 minutes to present its draft white paper and then there will be 1 0 
minutes for discussion. 
4:00-4:05 
May 17,2002 
Closing Remarks 
Conference Chairs 
Discussion of follow-up meeting(s) and projects 
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Appendix II 
Participants in the DIMACS Working Group Meeting on Mathematical Sciences Methods for the 
Study of Deliberate Releases of Biological Agents and their Consequences 
First meeting, March 22 - 23, 2002 
DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ 
Jean Marie Arduino, Merck Research Laboratories 
Douglas Arnold, Institute for Mathematics and its Applications, University of Minnesota 
David Banks, FDA 
Sankar Basu, IBM 
Lora Billings, Montclair State University 
Michael Boechler, Innovative Emergency Management, Inc . 
John Bombardt, IDA 
Marco Bonetti, Harvard University 
Fred Brauer, University of Wisconsin 
Adam Buchsbaum, AT&T Labs Research 
Donald Burke, Johns Hopkins University 
Carlos Castillo-Chavez, Organizer, Cornell University 
Alok Chaturvedi, Purdue University 
Keith Cooper, Rutgers University 
Derek Cummings, Johns Hopkins University 
Stephen DiPippo, Center for Communications Research 
Joseph DiPisa, Rutgers University 
Robert Duncan, University ofNew Mexico 
May 17,2002 52 
• 
• 
• 
Richard Ebright, Rutgers University 
Irene Eckstrand, NIH 
James Flanagan, Rutgers University 
John Giasser, CDC 
Karl Hadeler, University of Tuebingen 
Teresa Hamby, NJ Department of Health & Senior Services 
Drew Harris, UMDNJ 
Richard Heffernan, NYC Department of Health 
Carlos Hernandez Suarez, University of Colima 
Donald Hoover, Rutgers University 
Mac Hyman, Los Alamos National Lab 
Sorin Istrail, Celera Genomics 
Mel Janowitz, Rutgers University 
Edward Kaplan, Yale University 
Thomas Kepler, The Santa Fe Institute 
Jon Kettenring, Telcordia Technologies 
Mark Koch, Sandia National Labs 
James Koopman, University of Michigan 
Moshe Kress, Ctr. for Military Analyses (CEMA) 
Simon Levin, Princeton University 
Alun Lloyd, Institute for Advanced Study 
David Madigan, Rutgers University 
Ellis McKenzie, NIH 
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Shailendra Raj Mehta, Purdue University 
Peter Merkle, Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
William Mills, CIA 
S. Muthukrishnan, Rutgers University 
Roseanna Neupauer, University of Virginia 
Mai Nguyen, CIA 
Rafail Ostrovsky, Telcordia Technologies 
David Ozonoff, Boston University 
Marcelo Pagano, Harvard University 
Manish Parashar, Rutgers University 
David Pennock, NEC Research 
Fred Roberts, Organizer, Rutgers University 
Henry Rolka, CDC 
David Rosenbluth, Telcordia Technologies 
Estelle Russek-Cohen, University of Maryland 
Ira Schwartz, Naval Research Lab 
Larry Shepp, Rutgers University 
Carl Simon, University of Michigan 
Lone Simonsen, NIAID -NIH 
Annette Sobel Sandia National Labs 
Eduardo Sontag, Rutgers University 
Alfred Steinberg, MITRE 
Mike Steuerwalt, NSF 
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Stephen Tennenbaum, Cornell University 
John Tesoriero, NJ Commission on Science and Technology 
Michael Trahan, Sandia National Labs 
David Waltz, NEC Research 
Daniel Wartenberg, University of Medicine and Dentistry ofNJ 
Peter Winkler, Bell Labs 
• 
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